



Funded by
the European Union



HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN GEORGIA IN 2025

ASSESSMENT BY THE GEORGIAN YOUNG LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION

10 DECEMBER 2025

HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN GEORGIA 2025

ASSESSMENT OF THE GEORGIAN YOUNG LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION

DECEMBER 10, 2025

This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union (EU) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EU and UNDP.

Heads of Publication: NONA KURDOVANIDZE
TAMAR ONIANI

Authors: TAMAZ KIRTAVA
TAMAR BOCHORISHVILI
IOSEB EDISHERASHVILI
MARIAM OKRUASHVILI
MARIAM JIKIDZE
MZIA GOCHELASHVILI
NANA MTCHEDLISHVILI
FATIMA CHAPICHADZE

Editor: KHATUNA KVIRALASHVILI

Technical Editor: IRAKLI SVANIDZE

It is prohibited to reprint, reproduce or distribute the materials of this publication for commercial purposes without prior written permission of Georgian Young Lawyers Association.

J. Kakhidze street #15, Tbilisi, Georgia
(+995 32) 295 23 53, 293 61 01
www.gyla.ge

© 2025, *Georgian Young Lawyers Association*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD	4
SUMMARY	5
CHAPTER 1 - FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION	6
1.1. “Foreign Agents Registration Act” (so-called FARA)	6
1.2. Amendments to the Law “on Grants”	7
1.3. Monitoring of civil society organizations under the law on Grants and FARA	8
1.4. Freezing of the accounts and use of criminal mechanisms against civil society organizations and human rights defenders	9
1.5. The impact of restrictive legislative space on civil society organizations	10
CHAPTER 2 - FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION	12
2.1. Legislative changes related to profane statements and defamation	12
2.2. Proceedings related to profane statements towards a political officials	12
2.3. Legislative changes restricting the media	13
2.3.1. Prohibition of broadcasters receiving foreign funding	13
2.3.2. New, vague obligations related to “fairness and impartiality”	13
2.3.3. Restrictions of Media in court	14
CHAPTER 3 - FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY	15
3.1. Violent dispersal and violence by third parties against participants in assemblies and demonstrations	15
3.2. Legislative changes related to assembly-demonstration	15
3.3. Proceedings related to administrative offenses in the context of freedom of assembly	17
3.4. Use of facial recognition cameras as a mechanism for administrative fines	18
CHAPTER 4. CRIMINAL JUSTICE	20
4.1. Criminal Justice in the Context of Freedom of Assembly	20
4.1.1. Criminal cases from spring 2024 to September 2025	20
4.1.2. Criminal cases after October 4, 2025	23
4.2. Other criminal cases of high public interest	24
CHAPTER 5 - THE RIGHT TO LIFE	28
CHAPTER 6 - PROHIBITION OF TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT	31
6.1. State-sponsored mistreatment	31
6.2. Ineffective investigation into torture and ill-treatment of protest participants	31
6.3. Deterioration of institutional mechanisms related to the investigation of torture	33
CHAPTER 7 - THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY	35
CHAPTER 8 - ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS	37
8.1. Workers rights	37
8.1.1. Dismissal of civil servants	37
8.1.2. Violation of miners’ labor rights in Chiatura	38
8.2. The right to decent housing	39
8.3. The right to live in a healthy environment	40
ANNEX	41

FOREWORD

Human Rights Day is celebrated on December 10 each year, commemorating the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN General Assembly in Paris on December 10, 1948. This document first defined the universal protection of fundamental human rights, which became the subject of international supervision. At the same time, it had the specific goal of combating totalitarianism; therefore, human rights play a central role in ensuring international peace and security.

The Georgian Young Lawyers' Association annually assessed the human rights situation during the year in a statement format on December 10. The events that unfolded in Georgia in 2025 require a detailed description of the trends, patterns of behavior, and aspirations associated with significant restrictions on the essence of human rights.

2025 is the year of curtailed freedoms, a situation in which autocratic lawmaking and disproportionate restrictions on freedoms placed particular pressure on freedom of expression, assembly, and association, that is, on the rights that make democracy functional.

The Georgian Young Lawyers' Association closely monitored the ongoing events throughout the year, analyzing them in accordance with international and constitutional human rights standards and documenting them using objective and impartial assessment criteria.

The organization's staff prepared this report in a reality where the organization operated under the hostile attitude of the state, while propagandistic media outlets, along with restrictive legislation, constantly targeted the activities of the human rights organization.

SUMMARY

2025 was one of the most difficult years for Georgia in terms of human rights in recent decades. The process of strengthening authoritarianism that began in 2024 continued during this year, deliberately undermining human rights and democracy through various methods, including the deterioration of the legislative framework, physical violence, groundless arrests and fines, politically motivated justice, and disinformation campaigns. The particular targets of repression were precisely those instrumental rights that are the cornerstone of a democratic society and guarantors of the enjoyment of other rights: freedoms of expression, assembly, and association.

The situation in terms of **freedom of association** deteriorated significantly in 2025. In addition to adopting new repressive laws (the so-called FARA and amendments to the Law on Grants), which stigmatize civil society, restrict access to resources, and criminalize its activities, the Georgian Dream also harassed civil society through politically motivated investigations, seizure of accounts, and interrogations.

Freedom of expression was a particular target of the Georgian Dream. The legislative framework regulating **freedom of expression** significantly deteriorated, including by prohibiting insulting statements towards public servants and political officials, weakening guarantees for the protection of public discussion in relation to defamation, imposing a blanket ban on foreign funding for broadcasters, and restricting the activities of the media in the courts. Throughout 2025, the state attempted to create an environment of self-censorship in society through administrative sanctions regarding criticism of representatives of the Georgian Dream government.

The situation regarding **freedom of assembly** continued to deteriorate. The Georgian Dream introduced a number of amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses, the Criminal Code, and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations that were incompatible with human rights, introduced new offenses, and significantly increased sanctions. Throughout the year, groundless administrative detentions, high fines, and physical violence were actively used against protest participants.

One of the most significant problems was **politically motivated criminal justice**. GYLA's court monitoring revealed that in the context of protests in 2024–2025 (including 66 people arrested after the events of October 4, 2025), a total of 147 activists and politicians were charged under criminal law. Observation of the criminal cases of 69 individuals in the first-instance court from spring 2024 to September 2025 showed that the use of criminal prosecution mechanisms against activists is aimed not only at preventing specific possible crimes, but also at suppressing the rights to freedom of assembly and expression.

The state continued its **degrading treatments** towards demonstrators in 2025, as exemplified by the violent crackdown on the February 2 rally. Those responsible for the **systematic torture** in November–December 2024 remain unpunished. In addition to the investigation's continued superficial and ineffective nature, the institutional framework related to the investigation of police violence deteriorated further in 2025—the Special Investigation Service was abolished in July.

In 2025, the purge of critical civil servants from the civil service and the weakening of their labor guarantees continued, making them targets of **discrimination and labor rights violations**.

The current situation in terms of the realization of the **right to equality** and the situation of vulnerable groups remains problematic. The Georgian Dream, through its actions against civil space, leaves various groups in society without meaningful opportunities for self-organization, advocacy, and access to services. The state continues to undermine the progress achieved over the years in terms of gender equality through anti-gender rhetoric and laws, and to encourage sexism and homophobia/transphobia. In 2025, there were also cases in which the police themselves used gender-motivated insults, physical violence, and sexual harassment against women participating in protests.

Amid the ongoing political repression, **economic, social, and cultural rights** remain neglected, with numerous problems persisting. In 2025, the dire consequences of the current situation in terms of the right to adequate housing and the right to live in a safe environment were again evident. Notably, several cases were recorded in 2025 in which people's deaths were allegedly linked to the state's neglect of positive obligations arising from the **right to life** and the absence of preventive measures.

CHAPTER 1 - FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

2025, among other difficult challenges, was characterized by measures aimed at restricting freedom of association. This included both legislative amendments and their enforcement, as well as the arbitrary use of criminal mechanisms to disrupt the functioning of organizations and intimidate them.

In 2025, legislative measures targeting civil society included the “Foreign Agents Registration Act” (the so-called FARA) and amendments to the “Grants” Law. In addition, the 2024 law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” remains in force.

These laws, both individually and collectively, have a destructive effect on freedom of association. This is also confirmed by the pending “Russian law” case before the European Court of Human Rights — Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association and Others v. Georgia (31069/24) — and by the written positions of numerous third parties involved,¹ including the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights² and the Venice Commission.³

1.1. “Foreign Agents Registration Act” (so-called FARA)

On April 1, 2025, the Georgian Dream adopted the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).⁴ According to the law, a person may be required to register as an “agent of a foreign principal” if he or she, directly or through another person, participates in political activities in Georgia for the benefit or in the interests of a foreign principal and, at the same time, acts at the direction, request, instruction, or control of the foreign principal.⁵ The law provides overly broad monitoring powers for the Anti-Corruption Bureau, as well as extensive reporting requirements for registered organizations and an obligation to include corresponding notations on the materials they distribute. Failure to fulfill, or improper fulfillment of, the obligations established by this law leads to criminal liability, including up to five years of imprisonment.⁶

According to the explanatory note of the law, its adoption was conditioned by the claim that the Georgian Law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” cannot be enforced and that a new law is needed to “implement the will of the legislator.”⁷ The Venice Commission, in relation to the Law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” (the Russian law)⁸, emphasized that transparency, in isolation, cannot be a legitimate aim for restricting freedom of association.⁹ A reference to transparency is relevant only when it is connected to the objectives envisaged by the Convention, and even then, it must be interpreted narrowly.¹⁰ According to the Venice Commission, contrary to these principles, the Law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” undermines democratic pluralism and freedom of expression, which is incompatible with the requirement of legitimacy. The Commission reached the same conclusion with respect to the so-called FARA.¹¹

The vague definitions in the so-called FARA allow for overly broad and arbitrary interpretation, creating a chilling effect and an environment of self-censorship.¹² According to the Venice Commission, this law, like its predecessor — the Russian law — fails to meet the components of legality, necessity, and proportionality, and undermines the freedoms of association and expression.¹³

¹ GYLA, Non-governmental and Media Organizations have Submitted a Written Communication to Strasbourg Court on “Russian Law” Case 23.09.2025; see <https://gyla.ge/post/Ara-Rusulkanons-GYLA> [14.11.2025].

² Third party intervention by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe under Article 36, paragraph 3, of the European Convention on Human Rights Application no. 31069/24 Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association and Others v. Georgia, CommHR(2025)52, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/commissioner-o-flaherty-intervenes-in-ecthr-case-on-georgia-s-foreign-influence-law>, [14.11.2025].

³ Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2025)035, Amicus Curiae Brief for the European Court of Human Rights in the Case of Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association and Others v. Georgia (no. 31069/24) on the Law of Georgia on Transparency of Foreign Influence.

⁴ Georgian law “foreign agents registration act” <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/6461578?publication=0> [14.11.2025].

⁵ “Foreign Agents Registration Act”, Article 1.c

⁶ Criminal Code of Georgia, Article 355²

⁷ See the explanatory note to the “Foreign Agents Registration Act” and other files related to the draft law at the link: <https://info.parliament.ge/#law-drafting/30320> (available in Georgian) [14.11.2025].

⁸ It is also worth noting that at the time of preparation of the report (October 2025), Russian law is still in force.

⁹ VENICE COMMISSION, OPINION ON THE LAW ON THE REGISTRATION OF FOREIGN AGENTS, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW ON GRANTS AND OTHER LAWS RELATING TO “FOREIGN INFLUENCE”, CDL-AD(2025)034, 2025, para 66; see: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2025\)034-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2025)034-e) [14.11.2025].

¹⁰ ibid

¹¹ Ibid para. 66-67.

¹² Ibid para. 98.

¹³ Ibid para. 66, 77.

Like the Russian law, the so-called FARA, as well as the amendments to the Law on Grants discussed in the next subsection, pose a significant threat to the protection of personal data of civil society representatives and beneficiaries. The Council of Europe's Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) has also drawn attention to this threat. GRETA's 2025 report confirms risks to the protection of personal data, including the data of trafficking victims who are assisted by civil society organizations.¹⁴

1.2. Amendments to the Law "on Grants"

According to the amendments to the Law on Grants in 2025, the issuance of a grant by a foreign grantor requires the consent of the Government of Georgia or an authorized person/body designated by the Government of Georgia.¹⁵ Acceptance of a grant issued without such consent will result in the grantee being fined double the amount of the grant, effective April 17, 2025.¹⁶ The amendments grant the Anti-Corruption Bureau broad monitoring powers, which the Bureau is already using to harass civil society organizations (see Section 1.3.)

In addition, under the rules of the grant agreement with the government, the government will examine the purpose, volume, and specific direction of the use of funds and determine their compliance with the government program, the main strategic documents of the Government of Georgia, and the state interests of Georgia.¹⁷ This, in effect, obliges the grantor and recipient to ensure that the grant aligns with the government program and the policy of the ruling party in order to obtain approval. Such a requirement contradicts the "public watchdog" function of civil society and the media, which may, in certain cases, involve criticism of the strategy and/or priorities defined by the government.

These changes, like the so-called FARA, are closely linked to the disinformation campaign waged against civil society by the Georgian Dream and are aimed at denying critical media and civil society organizations access to resources essential for their activities. This is illustrated by the case related to the British Embassy grant project: on June 11, the British Embassy issued a statement announcing the cancellation of grant proposals, which was caused by the Georgian Dream's delay in issuing approvals.¹⁸ According to the statement, the Embassy attempted to obtain approval for grant projects from the government; however, the government's resolution on the grant approval procedure had not yet been adopted, meaning that no decision-making mechanisms or deadlines existed at that time.¹⁹ Due to this uncertainty, the Embassy cancelled planned grant proposals aimed at supporting transparency and competitiveness in the planned municipal elections.²⁰ This was followed by unsubstantiated attacks by Georgian Dream officials on the British Embassy, civil society organizations (including GYLA, which was intended to be one of the grant recipients), and independent media.²¹

¹⁴ GRETA, FOURTH EVALUATION ROUND, GEORGIA, GRETA(2025)11, see <https://rm.coe.int/greta-evaluation-report-on-the-implementation-of-the-council-of-europe/488028ee2c>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁵ Law of Georgia "On Grants", Article 5¹.

¹⁶ Law of Georgia "On Grants", Article 6⁴

¹⁷ Resolution of the Government of Georgia No. 250 of July 7, 2025 "On Approval of the Rules and Conditions of the Agreement with the Government of Georgia on the Issuance of a Grant by a Foreign Grantor (Donor)", Article 10, Paragraph 3, see <https://www.matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/6563350?publication=0> (available in Georgian) [14.11.2025].

¹⁸ Statement from the British Embassy, 11.06.2025; see: <https://www.facebook.com/ukingeorgia/posts/pfbid0U6nQEYWEZiHtaGRLFndfW-ZdYsvx73HKUMeoQwsEZm5vcpwNTZkDRJNFqFhqwHsv7l?rddid=Is3J51gpQx4mU1eS> [14.11.2025].

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ "Officials of the Georgian Dream, including the Chairman of the Georgian Dream Parliament, Shalva Papuashvili, the Vice Speaker of the Georgian Dream Parliament, Nino Tsilosani, and the Prime Minister of the Georgian Dream, Irakli Kobakhidze, made a number of statements aimed at discrediting the aforementioned organizations and equating their funding with the funding of extremism. - See Tabula, Papuashvili accuses the British ambassador of funding extremism and interfering in the elections, 11.06.2025, <https://tabula.ge/ge/news/736553-papuashvili-britanetis-elchs-ekstremizmis> (available in Georgian) [14.11.2025]; Imedi, Nino Tsilosani: I am really surprised by such a stated position of the British Embassy regarding the fact that the well-known destructive "NGOs" will no longer be funded, (available in Georgian) 11.06.2025 <https://imedinews.ge/ge/politika/390016/nino-tsilosani-namdvilad-mikvirs-britanetis-saelchos-aseti-gatskhadebuli-pozitsia-imastan-dakavshirebit-rom-kvelastvis-tsnobil-destruqtsiul-enjeoebs-vegar-daapinanseben> [14.11.2025]; Rustavi 2, Irakli Kobakhidze at the British Embassy: Like other democratic countries, external funding of political parties is prohibited in Georgia. When you fund party supplements, this is also an encouragement of extremism and cannot receive support from the government, 12.06.2025, <https://rustavi2.ge/ka/news/316845>, (available in Georgian) [14.11.2025].

1.3. Monitoring of civil society organizations under the law on Grants and FARA

The implementation of the Georgian Law on Grants is monitored by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, which is a highly politicized agency.²² This agency is also the main executive body for the so-called FARA. Within the framework of implementing and monitoring these laws, the Bureau has extensive investigative powers, including the authority to request information, conduct interrogations, and request seizures. According to the Venice Commission, the Anti-Corruption Bureau lacks guarantees of independence and political neutrality.²³ In addition, the Bureau already carries a wide range of responsibilities in combating corruption.²⁴ Expanding its mandate with powers under the so-called FARA and the Law on Grants creates an unusual combination of functions and raises questions about the extent to which these powers can be exercised fully and impartially.²⁵ In light of these circumstances, the Venice Commission highlights the serious risk of selective enforcement, targeting specific organizations or individuals.²⁶

It is noteworthy that, according to the changes announced in November 2025, the Anti-Corruption Bureau is to be abolished from March 2026, with all of its functions transferred to the State Audit Office.²⁷ In the context of this institutional restructuring, and against the backdrop of the broader consolidation of state institutions, the systemic problems that existed under the Anti-Corruption Bureau remain relevant and unresolved.

Between June 17 and 23, 2025, eight civil society organizations were served with court orders granting the Anti-Corruption Bureau's motions and requiring the organizations to submit to the Bureau an unlimited amount of legal, personal, financial, and technical information, including special categories of personal data related to beneficiaries and third parties, covering the period from January 1, 2024 to June 10, 2025.²⁸

According to the information disseminated by the organizations, the following norms were indicated as the legal basis for this, along with the Law on Grants:²⁹

- (1) Article 34¹ of the Organic Law "On Political Associations of Citizens", which concerns the financial monitoring of an electoral entity or an entity with a declared electoral purpose, even though these organizations were not entities with a declared electoral purpose.
- (2) Article 20¹³ of the Law of Georgia on the fight against Corruption, which concerns the request for information from individuals and legal entities for the purpose of detecting and monitoring corruption in public service, although it was not explained how the request for information was related to the detection and monitoring of corruption in public service.

In addition, it was unclear why organizations were required to submit information for the period from January 1, 2024 to June 10, 2025, when the amendments to the Law on Grants entered into force only on April 17, 2025,³⁰ or what justified the request for such a large volume of information, including the personal data of beneficiaries.

On August 11, seven of the civil society organizations from which the above-mentioned information was requested in June received a letter from the Anti-Corruption Bureau, in which the Bureau asked for explanations as to why they had not registered in accordance with the so-called FARA procedure.³¹

²² GYLA, FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT IN THE ABSENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS 2025, 7; see: https://admin.gyla.ge/uploads_script/publications/pdf/FOREIGN%20AGENTS%20REGISTRATION%20ACT%20IN%20THE%20ABSENCE%20OF%20THE%20INDEPENDENT%20INSTITUTIONS.pdf [14.11.2025].

²³ VENICE COMMISSION, OPINION ON THE LAW ON THE REGISTRATION OF FOREIGN AGENTS, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW ON GRANTS AND OTHER LAWS RELATING TO "FOREIGN INFLUENCE", CDL-AD(2025)034, 2025, par 79; see: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2025\)034-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2025)034-e) [14.11.2025].

²⁴ Ibid. 75.

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ Radio Liberty, Anti-Corruption Bureau to be abolished from March next year, 17.11.2025, see <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33593687.html>, [17.11.2025].

²⁸ The Social Justice Center, Georgian Dream, has already begun implementing laws that are destructive to civil society. 19.06.2025, see: <https://socialjustice.org.ge/en/products/kartulma-otsnebam-samokalako-sazogadoebistvis-damangreveli-kanonebis-gamoqeneba-ukve-daitsqo> [14.11.2025]; also: ISFED, The Anti-Corruption Bureau is also requesting information about beneficiaries of ISFED. 23.06.2025, <https://isfed.ge/eng/gantskhadebebi/benefitsiarebis-shesakheb-informatsias-antikoruftsuli-biuro-samartliani-archevnebisganats-itkhovs> [14.11.2025].

²⁹ The Social Justice Center, Georgian Dream, has already begun implementing laws that are destructive to civil society. 19.06.2025, see: <https://socialjustice.org.ge/en/products/kartulma-otsnebam-samokalako-sazogadoebistvis-damangreveli-kanonebis-gamoqeneba-ukve-daitsqo> [14.11.2025].

³⁰ The Social Justice Center, Georgian Dream, has already begun implementing laws that are destructive to civil society. 19.06.2025, see: <https://socialjustice.org.ge/en/products/kartulma-otsnebam-samokalako-sazogadoebistvis-damangreveli-kanonebis-gamoqeneba-ukve-daitsqo> [14.11.2025].

³¹ Radio Liberty, "We serve the interests of Georgian citizens" - NGOs responded to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, 22.08.2025, <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33510314.html>, [14.11.2025].

After September 8, 2025, a new group of civil society organizations (according to the information available to GYLA, more than 80 organizations, both civil and media organizations) received a letter from the Bureau in accordance with the Law on Grants, on the initiation of monitoring. The Anti-Corruption Bureau requires organizations to provide various categories of information related to their activities after April 16, 2025.³²

After the organizations provided written explanations to the Bureau as to why its request was illegal, the Bureau gradually began approaching the courts. On September 17, the Tbilisi City Court issued an order against nine organizations, including GYLA, fully approved the Bureau's requests without any substantive consideration of the legal grounds, merely repeating the Bureau's arguments. The Court of Appeal (which, in this case, is the final instance) also upheld the decision of the first-instance court.

The actions of the Anti-Corruption Bureau constitute a coordinated attack on civil society, aimed at persecuting organizations, pressuring them, and blatantly interfering with their autonomy.

1.4. Freezing of the accounts and use of criminal mechanisms against civil society organizations and human rights defenders

In 2025, the harassment of civil society organizations and human rights defenders involved not only monitoring by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, but also the misuse of criminal justice mechanisms, including the seizure of accounts, searches of residential premises, and interrogations.

The first wave of account freezes occurred in March 2025, when the accounts of five foundations were frozen. These foundations were raising funds to assist individuals fined during protests, including covering medical expenses for victims of police violence.³³ The seizure of the foundations' accounts was followed in April 2025 by searches of the homes of their representatives, carried out in gross violation of procedural guarantees.³⁴

In August 2025, the bank accounts of seven civil society organizations were frozen,³⁵ and their representatives were summoned for questioning.³⁶

The investigation, within the framework of which the above-mentioned measures were taken, stems from the following articles of the Criminal Code:³⁷

- Article 318, Part 1 - Sabotage;
- Article 19 in conjunction with Article 318, Part 2 - attempted sabotage under aggravating circumstances;
- Article 319 - Assisting a foreign country, a foreign organization, or an organization under foreign control in hostile activities;
- Article 321¹, Part 2, Subparagraph "a" - Financing of activities directed against the constitutional order and foundations of national security of Georgia or other material support of such activities by an organized group.

The law provides for severe penalties for the crimes covered by these articles, including imprisonment for a term of up to 15 years (Articles 319 and 321¹ (2) of the Criminal Code).

Although the investigation conducted by the Prosecutor's Office is formally an independent procedure from the "monitoring" carried out by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, it is clear that the state is using a wide range of repressive tools in a coordinated manner against NGOs and human rights defenders. In doing so, it seeks to intimidate organizations and their representatives, cut off their access to necessary resources, and baselessly, de facto, criminalize their activities.

³² GYLA The "Georgian Dream" has started a new stage of repressions against civil society, targeting up to 30 Georgian non-governmental organizations, 22.09.2025; see: <https://www.gyla.ge/en/post/Statemnet-22-09> [14.11.2025].

³³ Statement of the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia, 17.03.2025, https://pog.gov.ge/news/saqartvelos-prokuraturis-gantskhadeba-4736?fbclid=IwY2xjawJE8_1leHRuA2FlbQixMAABHUimY_By-9GOBh5sAUzTmMojzgjqZyilVmvXFpWpL4Z_r17gSvwXsZ5UA_aem_tx1zIHkpkfmlI3jWl-hOWNw&lng=geo, [14.11.2025].

³⁴ GYLA responds to the search and seizure of the homes of foundation representatives, 30.04.2025, <https://www.gyla.ge/post/GYLA-pon-debis-warmomadgenelta-saxlebschikhxreka>, (available in Georgian) [29.10.2025].

³⁵ Statement of the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia, 27.08.2025, <https://pog.gov.ge/news/saqartvelos-prokuraturis-gantskhadeba-4982>, [14.11.2025].

³⁶ Netgazeti, Prosecutor's Office Summons Heads of Civil Organizations for Questioning, 01.09.2025, <https://netgazeti.ge/life/783963/>, [14.11.2025].

³⁷ Statement of the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia, 17.03.2025, https://pog.gov.ge/news/saqartvelos-prokuraturis-gantskhadeba-4736?fbclid=IwY2xjawJE8_1leHRuA2FlbQixMAABHUimY_By-9GOBh5sAUzTmMojzgjqZyilVmvXFpWpL4Z_r17gSvwXsZ5UA_aem_tx1zIHkpkfmlI3jWl-hOWNw&lng=geo, [14.11.2025].

In addition, beginning on 2 December, the State Security Service started summoning for questioning individuals who had been respondents or appeared in the BBC investigative film. On 1 December, the BBC released an investigative documentary³⁸ and article³⁹ alleging that the State had used bromobenzyl cyanide (Camite),⁴⁰ mixed with water cannon, to disperse the 2024 protests. Following the publication, the State Security Service opened an investigation under the articles on abuse of official authority (Article 333 of the Criminal Code) and assistance to a foreign organization in hostile activities (Article 319 of the Criminal Code). (See Section 6.2.)⁴¹

In connection with the above investigation, doctors, protesters, and human rights defenders, including GYLA staff, were summoned for questioning.⁴² In the BBC film, GYLA discussed the torture of protesters and other systemic human rights violations committed during the 2024 mass protests.⁴³ These findings, documented in detail together with partner organizations, were published in a comprehensive report describing dozens of victims. The report is publicly available, and GYLA continues to speak openly about these issues in both local and international media.⁴⁴

The summoning of GYLA employees as witnesses in the investigation launched by the State Security Service raises serious concerns that the purpose is not to establish the truth, but to exert pressure on individuals and organizations that expose systemic human rights violations.⁴⁵

The formulation used by the State Security Service, particularly the reference to “damage to state interests”, is especially problematic in a context where the authorities consistently fail to conduct effective and independent investigations into alleged violence and other human rights abuses committed by law enforcement officers.⁴⁶

1.5. The impact of restrictive legislative space on civil society organizations

GYLA is pursuing the case Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association and Others v. Georgia (31069/24) before the European Court of Human Rights, submitted on behalf of 136 organizations and 4 individuals concerning the Russian-style law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” adopted in 2024.

This subsection is based on information provided by the applicant organizations in August 2025, which demonstrates that the cumulative effects of the restrictive environment for civil society and the legislation aimed at them (the Foreign Influence Act, the so-called FARA, and the amendments to the law on “Grants”) are as follows:

Only three of the applicants were registered in the register created under the Georgian Law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence.” The remaining organizations refused to register, citing the law’s incompatibility with the Constitution and international human rights standards, as well as the stigmatizing, insulting, and misleading label that distorts the essence of their activities.

As a result of these laws, the vast majority of organizations have suspended or significantly reduced their activities. Thirty-four organizations report that they have suspended their work, seventy-four indicate a reduction in their activities, and an additional twelve emphasize that they will soon be forced to suspend their operations altogether.

This is due to both the fear of sanctions provided for by the legislation, as well as the reduction/absence of finances. In addition, one of the factors determining the reduction in activity is the inability to cooperate with state agencies.

³⁸ BBC, Did Georgian police use a chemical weapon against protesters? – BBC World Service Documentaries, 01.11.2025, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z4-koO916Gk&t=133s>, [04.12.2025].

³⁹ BBC, WW1 toxic compound sprayed on Georgian protesters, BBC evidence suggests, 01.12.2025, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czrk7g50e1po>, [04.12.2025].

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Statement of the State Security Service, 01.12.2025, <https://ssg.gov.ge/news/1058/sus-shi-gamodzieba-daitsyo-BBC-is-mier-sajaro-sivrceshi-danashaulis-shesaxe-b-gavrcelebul-informaciastan-dakavshirebit>, [02.12.2025].

⁴² GYLA, State Security Service Summons GYLA Employees for Questioning in Connection with the BBC Investigative Film, 02.12.2025, <https://gyla.ge/en/post/GYLA-BBCsagamodziebopilmi-gamokitxvazedabareba>, [04.12.2025]; also, Radio Liberty, TI Director Eka Gigauri, as well as Dr. Gogi Chakhunashvili, co-author of the study, summoned by the State Security Service due to an interview with the BBC, 03.12.2025, <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33611641.html>, [04.12.2025].

⁴³ GYLA et al., Human Rights Crisis in Georgia Following the 2024 Parliamentary Elections, November 28, 2024–February 28, 2025, 2025.

⁴⁴ GYLA, State Security Service Summons GYLA Employees for Questioning in Connection with the BBC Investigative Film, 02.12.2025, <https://gyla.ge/en/post/GYLA-BBCsagamodziebopilmi-gamokitxvazedabareba>, [04.12.2025];

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

A total of 109 organizations report difficulties or the impossibility of obtaining funds. Of these, 19 note challenges in securing funding, while 90 state that they are unable to obtain any new funds at all.

Due to fear of sanctions, the threat of criminal liability, and the ongoing campaign against civil society organizations, management representatives have left some organizations. Thirty-one organizations report the departure or replacement of management representatives, including board members or directors. Twelve organizations also indicate obstacles related to the registration of changes to organizational documentation, such as artificial alteration of applications and deliberate delays in the process.

97 organizations report either reducing staff numbers or losing their employees entirely: 48 organizations indicate a reduction in personnel, while 49 organizations now operate without any paid employees. Of these, 23 organizations are able to continue their activities solely through volunteer efforts by management or staff.

62 organizations note that they have become targets of propaganda attacks, including disinformation statements by officials, stories in government-aligned media, or coordinated discrediting campaigns on social networks.

32 organizations report reputational harm and difficulties in cooperating with partners. This is reflected in beneficiaries avoiding communication or participation in their projects, and partners refraining from collaboration. According to the organizations, the underlying reasons include both the government's anti-civil-society propaganda and fears that association with an NGO may create problems for beneficiaries or partners.

The impact of the restrictive environment is particularly severe for local community organizations. According to the Community Development Program's database, prepared by the Center for Strategic Development and Research of Georgia (CSR DG), 114 community groups and organizations were registered in 2024.⁴⁷ Based on CSR DG's updated 2025 mapping, 77 of these groups have already ceased their activities, and only 37 community organizations/groups continue to operate in the country.⁴⁸ The organizations that remain active are largely in the process of completing their final projects.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ CSR DG, Community Groups and Organizations Database 2025, see <https://www.csrdg.ge/en/info-page/satemo-jgufebisa-da-organizatsiebis-monatsemta-baza-2025> [14.11.2025].

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

CHAPTER 2 - FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

The year 2025 is marked by a strong trend of restrictions on freedom of expression. The legislative framework related to freedom of expression and the legal guarantees intended to protect public debate have significantly deteriorated. Threats to the media have intensified as a result of the ban on foreign funding, the restrictions on video and audio recording in court, and new content regulations. Examples of how these legislative changes are applied in practice show that their purpose is to undermine freedom of expression and create an environment of self-censorship.

2.1. Legislative changes related to profane statements and defamation

On February 6, 2025, Article 173¹⁶ was added to the Administrative Offenses Code of Georgia. The provision established administrative liability for verbal insults, cursing, or other offensive actions directed at a Georgian state-political official, political official, civil servant, person equated with a civil servant, and/or public servant during the performance of their official duties or in connection with the performance of those duties (except in cases covered by the Criminal Code of Georgia). The administrative penalty for this offense is a fine ranging from 1,500 to 4,000 GEL or imprisonment for up to 45 days. A repeated offense is punishable by a fine of 2,500 to 6,000 GEL or imprisonment for a term of 5 to 60 days.⁵⁰

According to ODIHR, Article 173¹⁶ of the Code of Administrative Offenses allows for arbitrary interpretation.⁵¹ It is overly broad and subjective, referring to “verbal insults, swearing, insulting gestures and/or other offensive actions” without providing any description, definition, or other elements necessary to determine the content or scope of the violation.⁵²

These amendments unjustifiably restrict the constitutional right to freedom of expression and create a chilling effect intended to instill fear and suppress criticism of Georgian Dream. The European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that public figures have a significantly higher duty to tolerate criticism than private individuals.⁵³ Politicians and public officials are not entitled to heightened protection against critical expression, including criticism conveyed in harsh or offensive language.⁵⁴

In addition, several aspects of civil dispute resolution concerning defamation were changed. On June 26, 2025, amendments to the Law on Speech and Expression abolished the qualified privilege for statements containing false facts, removed the damage component from the definition of defamation, shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, and eliminated the legal guarantee for the protection of journalistic sources.⁵⁵

These changes significantly weaken the protections for public discussion on matters of public interest. They create the risk of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP), in which politically or economically influential individuals file unfounded defamation claims against active members of society with the aim of restricting their freedom of expression and imposing financial burdens.⁵⁶

2.2. Proceedings related to insults towards a political officials

Practice has shown that, based on the amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses, administrative proceedings have typically been initiated against activists and individuals expressing critical opinions about persons associated with the Georgian Dream.⁵⁷ Courts, relying on Article 173¹⁶ of the Code, have imposed both fines and

⁵⁰ GYLA, Georgian Dream declares many aspects of the right to protest illegal- accelerated amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses, 05.02.2025, <https://gyla.ge/en/post/qartuli-ocneba-protestis-uflebis-bevr-aspeqts-zgudavs> [14.11.2025].

⁵¹ ODIHR, Opinion-Nr.: FOPA-GEO/536/2025 [TN], para. 104, <https://www.osce.org/odihr/587466>, [14.11.2025].

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Lacroix v. France, No. 41519/12, European Court of Human Rights, 2017.

⁵⁴ Drousiotis v. Cyprus, No. 42315/15, European Court of Human Rights, 2022.

⁵⁵ For detailed information about the above-mentioned changes, see the publication: GYLA, Laws Against Speech: Analysis of Legislative Amendments Restricting Freedom of Expression and Media Activities in Georgia, February 2025 - July 2025, pp. 18-20, see: https://admin.gyla.ge/uploads_script/publications/pdf/LAWS%20AGAINST%20SPEECH.pdf [13.11.2025].

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Complaints over Facebook statuses — Who is “Dream” suing in court, Publika, June 11, 2025, <https://publika.ge/sachivrebi-facebook-is-statusebis-gamo-vis-ibarebs-ocneba-sasamartloshi/>, [14.11.2025]; Djorjoliani: Mariam Lashkhi is suing me over a Facebook status in which I called her a “slave”, Publika, June 11, 2025, <https://publika.ge/djorjoliani-mariam-lashkhi-michivis-facebook-is-statusis-gamo-romelshic-mona-vu-wode/> [14.11.2025].

administrative imprisonment as penalties.⁵⁸ GYLA requested statistical information on the number of cases under this article. Although public agencies did not provide this information, publicly available data confirm that courts have unjustifiably applied severe sanctions, including administrative imprisonment, and rarely imposed the minimum fines.

It is also noteworthy that the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the courts have actively used this article and its corresponding high sanctions against well-known public figures, which may indicate an attempt to create a chilling effect in society through high-profile cases.⁵⁹

2.3. Legislative changes restricting the media

2.3.1. Prohibition on broadcasters receiving foreign funding

In 2025, the Broadcasting Law was amended, prohibiting the following: the receipt by a broadcaster of direct or indirect funding from a foreign power, including cash or other material benefits of value; the purchase of a broadcaster's services by a foreign power; and the direct or indirect funding and/or co-financing of the preparation and/or broadcasting of a program.⁶⁰

The European Court of Human Rights, like the Court of Justice of the European Union, has emphasized that any legislative restriction on foreign funding of associations must be justified by a sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society. Legislation that applies such restrictions blanketly, based on the assumption that all foreign funding poses a threat to the political or economic interests of the state, cannot be considered to meet this standard.⁶¹ The reasoning presented in the explanatory memorandum is broad and superficial, failing to establish a connection between the regulation and a legitimate aim defined by the Convention that could justify interference with the right.⁶² However, even assuming, for the sake of discussion, that the legislator's justification responds to a legitimate aim—such as national security or public safety—the restriction imposed by law cannot be considered a necessary measure in a democratic society to achieve this aim,⁶³ as it does not address an acute public problem.

The Venice Commission has strongly criticized the blanket ban on foreign funding for broadcasters and called on the state to repeal it. According to the Commission, this regulation does not distinguish between funding that genuinely threatens democracy and funding that supports legitimate journalistic activity and civic engagement.⁶⁴ The Commission notes that it undermines media pluralism and fails to meet the standards of necessity and proportionality.⁶⁵

2.3.2. New, vague obligations related to “fairness and impartiality”

As a result of the amendments adopted on April 1, 2025, Article 54 of the Broadcasting Law, under the heading “Fairness and Impartiality,” introduced new vague and unpredictable norms that allow for arbitrary interpretation and content control by broadcasters. According to paragraph 4 of this article, “When covering political or other disputes in news and socio-political programs, the broadcaster must ensure balance in each program or throughout the program cycle. If, due to the format of the program, balance is planned throughout the program cycle, the audi-

⁵⁸ Mariam Geguchadze, Misha Mshvildadze, Giorgi Makarashvili and Dea Mamiseishvili Fined for Facebook Posts, Publika, June 12, 2025, <https://publika.ge/mariam-geguchadze-misha-mshvildadze-giorgi-makarashvili-da-dea-mamiseishvili-facebook-postebis-gamo-daajarimes/>, [14.11.2025].; Tatia Afriamashvili Sentenced to 12 Days in Prison Based on Mariam Lashkhi's Complaint, May 30, 2025, <https://tabula.ge/ge/news/735975-mariam-lashkhis-sachivris-sapudzvelze-tatia> [14.11.2025]; Albi Kordzaia sentenced to 10 days in prison in a case initiated on the pretext of insulting Tea Tsulukiani, Publika, June 4, 2025, <https://publika.ge/albikordzaia10dgianipati/> [14.11.2025]; “Publika”, “Zugdidi activist was imprisoned for 5 days for calling a city hall employee “focho” in a FB comment”, 09.07.2025, <https://publika.ge/aqtivisti-fb-komentarshi-meriis-tanamshromlistvisfochos-wodebis-gamo-5-dghit-daapatimes/> [14.11.2025].

⁵⁹ GYLA, “Prosecution of cases due to evaluative judgments expressed against politicians creates a precedent for mass censorship”, 12.07.2025, <https://www.gyla.ge/post/cenzuris-precendentebi-gyla> [13.11.2025].

⁶⁰ Law of Georgia “On Broadcasting”, Article 66¹.

⁶¹ *Ecodefence and Others v. Russia*, 9988/13, European Court of Human Rights, 2022, para. 166.

⁶² Such legitimate aims may be the interests of national security or public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health, morals or the rights of others. See Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

⁶³ *Ecodefence and Others v. Russia*, 9988/13, European Court of Human Rights, 2022, para. 166.

⁶⁴ VENICE COMMISSION, OPINION ON THE LAW ON THE REGISTRATION OF FOREIGN AGENTS, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW ON GRANTS AND OTHER LAWS RELATING TO “FOREIGN INFLUENCE”, CDL-AD(2025)034, 2025, para: 120; see: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2025\)034-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2025)034-e) [29.10.2025].

⁶⁵ Ibid: see: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2025\)034-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2025)034-e) [29.10.2025].

ence must be informed about this on the very first day of the program.”⁶⁶ Regarding the Hungarian Media Law, the Venice Commission noted that it is questionable to what extent “balance” should be treated as a legal obligation.⁶⁷ This requirement lacks clarity and imposes a complex and uncertain duty on broadcasters.⁶⁸

The obligations stipulated in this article apply to TV and radio broadcasters. These matters were previously subject to media self-regulation, but under the amendments, they are now fully overseen by the Communications Commission. Violations of these obligations may result in a warning, a fine, suspension of the license/authorization (if a warning and fine have already been applied), or revocation (if the license suspension period has expired but the violation persists).⁶⁹ It is worth noting that the Communications Commission has repeatedly been accused of selective enforcement, interfering in the activities of media outlets critical of the government, and imposing disproportionately high fines on them.⁷⁰

In addition, the abuse of the justice system and its selective application against free expression is alarming. During the protests against the “Russian law” in April–May 2024, activists, journalists, and human rights defenders were threatened and attacked.⁷¹ A video released publicly on May 31, 2024, shows Dito Samkharadze, a member of parliament from the Georgian Dream, as one of those involved in the persecution of these individuals.⁷² However, this has not led to any legal consequences.

2.3.3. Restrictions on Media in court

On June 26, 2025, the Georgian Dream adopted amendments to the Organic Law on Common Courts. The new rules prohibit photography, filming, broadcasting, and audio recording in court buildings, courtrooms, and courtyards, with this right granted only to the court or an authorized person.⁷³ Previously, the public broadcaster could freely record court hearings, except in cases closed by court decision, and was obliged to share the recordings with other media outlets upon request. If it did not cover a hearing, another broadcaster could apply to the judge in advance to do so.

The new blanket ban requires journalists to obtain permission from the High Council of Justice for each specific hearing,⁷⁴ effectively restricting media access. Publicity is a fundamental element of a fair trial and may only be limited in exceptional circumstances. While the right to record a court hearing is not absolute, any restrictions must strike a proper balance between the rights protected under Articles 6 (fair trial), 8 (private life), and 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention.

These amendments do not seek to maintain such a balance but instead impose disproportionate restrictions on media activity, preventing coverage of cases of public interest. Many hearings, including first appearance hearings, are scheduled only a few hours in advance, leaving the media insufficient time to obtain permission from the High Council of Justice.⁷⁵ The law does not provide alternative means of public access if permission is denied or delayed, creating a bureaucratic mechanism that effectively prohibits photography, video, and audio recording of court proceedings. In practice, journalists have been unable to exercise this right.

⁶⁶ Law of Georgia “On Broadcasting”, Article 54.

⁶⁷ VENICE COMMISSION, OPINION ON MEDIA LEGISLATION (ACT CLXXXV ON MEDIA SERVICES AND ON THE MASS MEDIA, ACT CIV ON THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, AND THE LEGISLATION ON TAXATION OF ADVERTISEMENT REVENUES OF MASS MEDIA) OF HUNGARY, CDL-AD(2015)015, par 50, see [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2015\)015-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2015)015-e) [14.11.2025].

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Law of Georgia “On Broadcasting”, Articles 71-74.

⁷⁰ GYLA, Laws Against Speech: Analysis of Legislative Amendments Restricting Freedom of Expression and Media Activities in Georgia, February 2025– July 2025, p. 16, see. https://admin.gyla.ge/uploads_script/publications/pdf/LAWS%20AGAINST%20SPEECH.pdf

⁷¹ GYLA, “Georgia: Human Rights Amidst the Russian Law” 2024, p.19.

⁷² See the video published by Dimitri Samkharadze at <https://www.facebook.com/dito.samkharadze/videos/423357193946251/> , [14.11.2025].

⁷³ Organic Law “On Common Courts”, Article 131.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ GYLA, Media Cannot Cover Cases of Persons Detained in the Context of Protests from the Courtroom, 30.06.2025, see <https://gyla.ge/post/mediis-shezgudva-sxdomebze-saia> , [14.11.2025].

CHAPTER 3 - FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

Freedom of assembly was particularly under attack in 2025. This year, the growing authoritarian assault on freedom of assembly continued, manifesting itself in various forms: on February 2, 2025, as in November–December 2024, the state violently dispersed a peaceful demonstration. In addition, there were a number of incidents involving attacks on protest participants by third parties. The lack of an appropriate response from the police indicates that these manifestations of violence were encouraged by, and presumably coordinated with, the Georgian Dream. Legislation related to freedom of assembly significantly deteriorated during the year. The Georgian Dream actively and arbitrarily used administrative detention and high administrative sanctions to punish participants in peaceful protests. Politically motivated criminal prosecutions and convictions of assembly participants also represented an alarming trend.

3.1. Violent dispersal and violence by third parties against participants in assemblies and demonstrations

On February 2, 2025, a peaceful demonstration near Tbilisi Mall was violently dispersed by police. The crackdown was accompanied by physical violence and ill-treatment, similar to the systematic ill-treatment that occurred in November–December 2024 (see section 6.1, “State-sponsored ill-treatment”).

Attacks on participants in the assembly by third parties, both at the assembly site and outside it, were frequent. The lack of an adequate police response to such incidents, as well as statements by Georgian Dream officials, indicate that these acts of violence were coordinated with or encouraged by Georgian Dream.

On September 8, 2025, on Melikishvili Avenue, supporters of Georgian Dream physically assaulted peaceful demonstrators and media representatives.⁷⁶ Violent physical and verbal attacks on demonstrators and journalists took place in the presence of police, yet the police did not respond effectively.⁷⁷ Law enforcement officers failed to take the necessary measures to stop the violent actions and ensure accountability, despite the fact that, according to publicly released footage, the police had the opportunity to prevent the violence and arrest the perpetrators on the spot.⁷⁸ Senior Georgian Dream officials publicly responded to the attack on peaceful demonstrators and, through their statements, effectively confirmed their support for the perpetrators.⁷⁹

There were other periodic attacks on protesters during the year. For example, on June 22, a car drove into a protest rally and injured a participant. On May 5, activists returning from a demonstration were attacked by unknown individuals near an elevator in an apartment building, where they were sprayed with pepper spray and green paint.⁸⁰

3.2. Legislative changes related to assembly-demonstration

In 2025, the legislative framework regulating assemblies and demonstrations, which was already problematic, significantly deteriorated.

In February 2025, amendments were made to the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations and the Code of Administrative Offences. New offenses were introduced, including a ban on “insulting” a state representative; sanctions for protest-related offenses were significantly increased; the maximum term of administrative detention was quadrupled to 60 days; restrictions were imposed on gatherings and demonstrations in buildings; the concept and obligations of an assembly organizer were overly broadly interpreted; and certain offenses were made punishable directly by the police, simplifying the imposition of sanctions.⁸¹ These changes were preceded by legislative amendments adopted in 2024, which also introduced new offenses and increased sanctions related to protests.⁸² The

⁷⁶ GYLA responds to the attack on the participants of the protest rally on Melikishvili Avenue on September 8, 2025, 09.09.2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/en/post/8-setemberi-saas-shefaseba>, [14.11.2025].

⁷⁷ *ibid*

⁷⁸ *ibid*

⁷⁹ *ibid*

⁸⁰ GYLA responds to the attack on Vano Tarkhishvili see: <https://www.gyla.ge/post/tavdasxma-vanotarxnishvilze-saia>, [14.11.2025].

⁸¹ For detailed information about the amendments, see: GYLA The “Georgian Dream” Declares Many Aspects of the Right to Protest as Offences - the Amendments Made in an Expedited Manner to the Administrative Offences Code of Georgia, 05.02.2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/gartuli-ocneba-protestis-uflebis-bevr-aspeqts-zgudavs>, [14.11.2025].; Also: GYLA, Repressive legislative amendments to the Law on Assembly and Manifestation passed in third reading, 07.02.2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/represiuli-sakanonmdablo-cvlilebebi-saias-shefaseba>, [14.11.2025].

⁸² GYLA, What amendments will be made to the Administrative Offences Code to further restrict the freedom of assembly? 16.12.2024, see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/ra-tsvlilebebi-shedis-administraciul-samartaldargvevata-kodeqssh>, [14.11.2025].

February 2025 amendments, together with the December 2024 amendments, were assessed negatively by both the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)⁸³ and the Venice Commission.⁸⁴ The ODIHR noted that it was questionable whether adding Article 353² to the Code was necessary, as it may overlap with or duplicate Article 151 (threats).⁸⁵ The ODIHR also highlighted the sharp and unjustified increase in sanctions and the failure of the amendments to account for the differing consequences and degrees of severity of various aggravating circumstances.⁸⁶ According to the ODIHR, such disproportionate sanctions and aggravating circumstances may have a chilling effect on the exercise of rights, including the freedoms of expression and assembly.⁸⁷

A note was added to Articles 222 (“Seizure or Blockage of a Broadcasting or Communications Facility or an Object of Strategic or Special Importance”) and 320 (“Seizure or Blockage of an Object of Strategic or Special Importance for Terrorist Purposes”) of the Criminal Code, according to which the list of objects of strategic and/or special importance is to be defined by a resolution of the Government of Georgia. According to ODIHR, empowering the government to determine such a list through a resolution contradicts the principles of legal certainty and foreseeability.⁸⁸ Before this legislative amendment entered into force, on 31 January the Government of Georgia amended Resolution No. 361 of 23 October 2024 “On Approval of the List of Objects of Strategic and/or Special Importance,” adding international roads to the list.⁸⁹ This change was adopted shortly after the announcement of a protest rally planned for 2 February on the Tbilisi–Senaki–Leselidze international road near Tbilisi Mall, and was directed specifically against that gathering. Eight individuals detained in connection with the demonstration were subsequently charged under Article 222 of the Criminal Code.⁹⁰

In October 2025, amendments to the Administrative Offences Code and the Criminal Code further deteriorated the legal environment regulating freedom of assembly. Sanctions for several administrative offenses were increased, including the introduction of administrative imprisonment⁹¹ as the sole form of punishment for covering one’s face during an assembly and for blocking the carriageway.⁹² Under the amendments to the Criminal Code, a person who has already been administratively punished for violating the rules governing assemblies or demonstrations, or for disobeying the police, becomes criminally liable if they commit the same act again.⁹³ These changes significantly undermine freedom of assembly and, in effect, criminalize the exercise of this right. The amendments were also strongly criticized by the ODIHR, stating that the amendments raise serious concerns due to their inconsistency with international human rights obligations and should be repealed.⁹⁴

⁸³ OSCE ODIHR, URGENT OPINION ON THE AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW ON ASSEMBLIES AND DEMONSTRATIONS, THE CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCES AND THE CRIMINAL CODE OF GEORGIA (AS ADOPTED ON 6 FEBRUARY 2025), Opinion-Nr.: FOPA-GEO/536/2025 [TN], 6 March 2025, para 107. see <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/2/587466.pdf>, [14.11.2025].

⁸⁴ Venice Commission, GEORGIA URGENT OPINION ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCES AND THE LAW ON ASSEMBLIES AND DEMONSTRATIONS, Opinion No. 1226/2024, see [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=C-DL-PI\(2025\)004-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=C-DL-PI(2025)004-e), [14.11.2025].

⁸⁵ OSCE ODIHR, URGENT OPINION ON THE AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW ON ASSEMBLIES AND DEMONSTRATIONS, THE CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCES AND THE CRIMINAL CODE OF GEORGIA (AS ADOPTED ON 6 FEBRUARY 2025), Opinion-Nr.: FOPA-GEO/536/2025 [TN], 6 March 2025, para 107. see <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/2/587466.pdf>, [14.11.2025].

⁸⁶ *ibid*

⁸⁷ OSCE ODIHR, URGENT OPINION ON THE AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW ON ASSEMBLIES AND DEMONSTRATIONS, THE CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCES AND THE CRIMINAL CODE OF GEORGIA (AS ADOPTED ON 6 FEBRUARY 2025), Opinion-Nr.: FOPA-GEO/536/2025 [TN], 6 March 2025, para 107. see <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/2/587466.pdf>, [14.11.2025].

⁸⁸ *Ibid* para 106.

⁸⁹ Resolution of the Government of Georgia No. 361 of October 23, 2024 on approving the list of objects of strategic and/or special importance.

⁹⁰ Publika, Court grants bail to 8 people detained near Tbilisi Mall, 05.02.2025; see <https://publika.ge/tbilisi-moltan-dakavebul-8-pirs-sasamart-lom-sapatimro-girao-sheufarda/>, [24.10.2025].

⁹¹ The use of a fine instead of administrative detention remains possible only in the exceptional case provided for in Part 3 of Article 32 of the Code of Administrative Offences, according to which administrative detention cannot be imposed on a pregnant woman, a mother with a child under 12 years of age, a person under the age of 18, or a person with a severe or significantly pronounced disability.

⁹² See the Law of Georgia “On Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences of Georgia”, adopted on 16.10.2025, document number 993-IVMC-XIMΠ. See also: GYLA, “Georgian Dream” continues authoritarian lawmaking with the initiative to criminalize freedom of assembly, 13.10.2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/GYLA-avtoritaruli-kanonshemoqmedebis-shepaseba>, [14.11.2025].

⁹³ See the Law of Georgia “On Amendments to the Criminal Code of Georgia”, date of adoption 16.10.2025, document number 992-IV86-XI83.. See also: GYLA, “Georgian Dream” continues authoritarian lawmaking with the initiative to criminalize freedom of assembly, 13.10.2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/GYLA-avtoritaruli-kanonshemoqmedebis-shepaseba>, [14.11.2025].

⁹⁴ OSCE ODIHR, Urgent Opinion on the Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code of Georgia (as adopted on 16 October 2025), Opinion-Nr.: FOPA-GEO/564/2025 [ALC/TN], see: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/601503>, [18.11.2025].

3.3. Proceedings related to administrative offenses in the context of freedom of assembly

The Georgian Young Lawyers Association has indicated in a number of statements that proceedings related to administrative offenses are usually used to create a punitive effect on participants in gatherings and demonstrations and to intimidate demonstrators.⁹⁵ This is evidenced by the large number of proceedings related to administrative offenses.

On September 18, 2025, GYLA requested statistical information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia and the Tbilisi City Court regarding the number of cases⁹⁶ initiated under Part 5 of Article 174^{1,97} as well as Article 173¹⁶ of the Code of Administrative Offenses of Georgia.⁹⁸ Neither agency provided the requested data.⁹⁹ The court cited the excessive volume of information to be processed as the reason for non-disclosure, while the Ministry of Internal Affairs did not respond to the request at all.

Nevertheless, the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, through the NGO Legal Aid Network and Hotline database, has access to statistics that demonstrate the high number of proceedings related to administrative offenses.

The network's hotline received a total of more than **8,500 calls**¹⁰⁰ between November 19, 2024 and September 10, 2025. Administrative proceedings were initiated against about **2,000 individuals** for participating in assemblies and demonstrations on various grounds.

- **544** people were detained administratively.
- The network's lawyers were able to visit **458 detainees** in temporary detention centers.
- The network's lawyers assisted nearly **1,400 individuals** in appealing administrative offense reports issued against them.¹⁰¹

Although GYLA's information shows a large number of administrative offense-related proceedings, this information is not complete, as the statistics are based only on information received through the legal aid network of non-governmental organizations.

It is noteworthy that during the reporting period, the practice of detention (which is the last resort by representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) of both demonstrators and critical citizens was arbitrarily used.¹⁰² Arbitrary detention in some cases stems from reasons such as bringing a chair to the parliament or clapping.¹⁰³

The European Court of Human Rights, including in its rulings concerning Georgia, has clarified that if a person's actions (in this case, their expression) are neither violent, nor aimed at violence, nor capable of escalating events, initiating detention against them is unlawful.¹⁰⁴ The Court has also emphasized that, in a democratic society, authorities must show a higher degree of tolerance toward individuals expressing critical views, even when such views are conveyed in an inappropriate or emotional manner.¹⁰⁵ Importantly, unlawful detention is often accompanied by

⁹⁵ GYLA, Ministry of Internal Affairs uses facial recognition technologies for total control against peaceful demonstrators, 12.03.2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/saxis-amomcnobi-kamerebi-saia>, [14.11.2025].

⁹⁶ GYLA's letter of September 18, 2025 to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, N8-04/52-25;; GYLA's letter of September 18, 2025 to the Tbilisi City Court, N8-04/51-25.

⁹⁷ This includes violation of the norms stipulated in Article 9 and Article 11 of the Law of Georgia "On Assemblies and Manifestations" (except for subparagraphs "a"—"c" and "e"—"g" of paragraph 2 of Article 11).

⁹⁸ This means, "verbally insulting, cursing, insulting, and/or committing other offensive acts against a Georgian state-political official, political official, state servant, person equated with a state servant, and/or public servant during the performance of official duties or in connection with the performance of official duties or activities."

⁹⁹ Letter of the Tbilisi City Court dated September 23, 2025, N3-0458/11816178

¹⁰⁰ For the purposes of preparing this report, statistics were available for the period from November 19, 2024, following the post-election protests, to September 10, 2024.

¹⁰¹ Results of the activities of the Legal Aid Network of Non-Governmental Organizations, GYLA, 21.10.2025, <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1251409307031089&set=pcb.1251411433697543>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁰² GYLA responds to the attempt by employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to detain a citizen in response to his criticism, 11.07.2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/moglaqis-mimart-dzalis-gadameteba-saia>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁰³ GYLA responds to the detention of students in front of the Parliament, 21.03.2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/saia-parlamntis-wit-studentebis-dakavebas-examureba>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁰⁴ Chkhartishvili v. Georgia, 31349/20, European Court of Human Rights 11/05/2023.

¹⁰⁵ Chkhartishvili v. Georgia, 31349/20, European Court of Human Rights 11/05/2023, 1484/07, 02/10/2012, §89. citation Hyde Park and Others v Moldova, nos. 5 and 6, nos 6991/08 and 15084/08, European Court of Human Rights, 14 September 2010, § 43; Nilsen and Johnsen v Norway, no 23118/93 European Court of Human Rights, 25 November 1999, §§ 52–53.

inhuman and degrading treatment. GYLA notes that the practice of unlawful detention by the Ministry of Internal Affairs is systemic.¹⁰⁶

Along with illegal arrests, the police have been increasingly stopping and searching citizens in 2025. As a rule, the police have stopped citizens without reason under the pretext of a superficial check, although the actions taken (opening backpacks, asking to unpack items from bags) go beyond the scope of a superficial check.¹⁰⁷

The amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses adopted in October 2025 (see section 3.2) were followed by a new wave of arrests of protest participants and the issuance of reports alleging riots. This is confirmed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs' statement of October 26, 2025, which indicated that 60 protest participants had been arrested over the preceding three days.¹⁰⁸

The large volume of administrative offense cases is further demonstrated by the fact that, on October 24 alone, the court considered the cases of 37 individuals, most of whom were sentenced to administrative detention.¹⁰⁹ After October 16, authorities also engaged in mass stops, drawing up reports, and confiscating items from individuals wearing masks in the vicinity of Rustaveli and Freedom Squares.¹¹⁰

According to data as of November 1, disseminated by online media following the October legislative amendments, the Ministry of Internal Affairs detained up to 130 people within 15 days, at least 57 of whom were sentenced to administrative detention.¹¹¹

These figures do not fully reflect the scale of detentions, as the Ministry has not released accurate information, and the number of administrative detentions continues to rise daily. In parallel, on November 3, 2025, the first case was recorded in which a person was charged under criminal law for the repeated commission of an administrative offense—specifically, for illegally blocking a road.¹¹²

3.4. Use of facial recognition cameras as a mechanism for administrative fines

Based on information from public sources, in December 2024 it was reported that the LEPL “Public Security Management Center – 112” purchased 30 cameras with facial and emotion recognition capabilities.¹¹³ In practice, the mass use of such cameras for purposes detrimental to human rights is typical of autocratic or totalitarian regimes. According to Human Rights Watch, the use of such technologies violates not only the right to privacy but also the freedoms of expression and association.¹¹⁴ In February 2025, GYLA's Personal Data Protection Service initiated an

¹⁰⁶ GYLA Appeals to the Prosecutor General's Office of Georgia: Initiate criminal prosecution against Zviad Kharazishvili and suspend his authority, 02.02.2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/saia-kharazishvilis-siskhlis-samartlebriv-debvnas-itxovs> . [14.11.2025].

¹⁰⁷ GYLA, MIA still actively uses the practice of illegal searches and detentions against citizens, 07.04.2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/ukanono-chxreka> , [14.11.2025].

¹⁰⁸ Statement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, October 26, 2025, see <https://police.ge/news/shinagan-sakme-ta-saministros-gantskhadeba-30/10078> , [14.11.2025].

¹⁰⁹ Yesterday, 37 citizens were tried for their love of their homeland, protest 24, October 25, 2025, <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=122202794654330944&set=a.122100419156330944>

¹¹⁰ Formula, Police issued a protocol for people to wear masks on Rustaveli, 19.10.2025, see <https://formulanews.ge/News/129567> [14.11.2025].; Publica, Facebook post of October 19, 2025, see <https://www.facebook.com/publika.ge/posts/-%E1%83%97%E1%83%90%E1%83%95%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1%E1%83%A3%E1%83%A4%E1%83%9A%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1%E1%83%9B%E1%83%9D%E1%83%94%E1%83%93%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C%E1%83%96%E1%83%94%E1%83%9E%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98%E1%83%AA%E1%83%98%E1%83%90%E1%83%9B%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A5%E1%83%90%E1%83%9A%E1%83%90%E1%83%A5%E1%83%94%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%A1%E1%83%98%E1%83%93%E1%83%94%E1%83%9C%E1%83%A2%E1%83%98%E1%83%A4%E1%83%98%E1%83%AA%E1%83%98%E1%83%A0%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1%E1%83%9B%E1%83%98%E1%83%96%E1%83%9C%E1%83%98%E1%83%97%E1%83%90%E1%83%A9%E1%83%94%E1%83%A0%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%A1%E1%83%9B%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A5%E1%83%90%E1%83%9A%E1%83%90/1582574419808769/> [14.11.2025].; YouTube user video, <https://www.youtube.com/shorts/I7sifNqi2P4> [14.11.2025].

¹¹¹ Publika's English-language Instagram page Publikaenglish, 01.11.2025, <https://www.instagram.com/publikaenglish/p/DQe2KVRDtEp/> [14.11.2025].

¹¹² GYLA responds to the criminal prosecution of the Rustaveli protest, 04.11.2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/Rustaveli-protestis-sisxlis-samartelbrivi-devna-GYLA> , [14.11.2025].

¹¹³ Radio Liberty, 112 purchased 30 cameras with facial and emotion recognition amid protests near the parliament, 14.12.2024, <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/%E1%83%90%E1%83%A5%E1%83%AA%E1%83%98%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1%E1%83%A4%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9C%E1%83%96%E1%83%94%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%AE%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%9B%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9B%E1%83%AA%E1%83%9C%E1%83%9D%E1%83%91%E1%83%98%E1%83%99%E1%83%90%E1%83%9B%E1%83%94%E1%83%A0%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98%E1%83%98%E1%83%A7%E1%83%98%E1%83%93%E1%83%94%E1%83%A1/33239681.html>, [14.11.2025].

¹¹⁴ Amnesty International, Amnesty International and more than 170 organisations call for a ban on biometric surveillance, 07.06.2021, see <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/06/amnesty-international-and-more-than-170-organisations-call-for-a-ban-on-biometric-surveillance/>, [14.11.2025].

investigation and study into the legality of the use and processing of data collected by these cameras.¹¹⁵

The Ministry of Internal Affairs is extensively using facial recognition camera footage against protesters in criminal cases. This practice is particularly evident in cases involving roadblocks. In many instances, the only evidence presented in such cases consists of photographs captured by facial recognition cameras, which, largely ignoring the relevant context, are treated by the court as sufficient to establish criminal liability. Courts frequently do not assess whether the identification was carried out lawfully or whether the person conducting the identification had appropriate access to protected databases in accordance with personal data protection legislation. This practice is deliberately used both to intimidate citizens and to control the future behavior of protesters. It also produces a chilling effect, leading to self-restriction in the exercise of freedom of expression. Video evidence from one administrative offense proceeding demonstrates that specific individuals are being monitored in such a way that the contents of their personal documents can be read upon close inspection.¹¹⁶

The European Court of Human Rights has found that the use of facial recognition technology and similar forms of direct surveillance constitutes interference with the rights to freedom of expression and privacy. The Court has further concluded that employing such technology in the context of exercising freedom of expression is incompatible with the principles and values of a democratic society governed by the rule of law.¹¹⁷ According to ODIHR, the State should refrain from using facial recognition and other biometric technologies against individuals who peacefully participate in assemblies.¹¹⁸ ODIHR further emphasizes that a strong, human rights-compliant legal framework must be in place to effectively protect the right to privacy, including with respect to facial images and related data.¹¹⁹ In particular, there should be a mechanism that allows individuals to know whether information about them has been collected and stored, and what type of information it includes.¹²⁰ Individuals should also have the possibility to object to the collection, storage, and processing of their personal data.¹²¹

In administrative offense case files, letters from the Ministry of Internal Affairs requesting video recordings from 112 are often used as evidence, specifying precisely which camera, at what time, and at which minute a citizen was allegedly standing on the roadway. These letters raise doubts about whether Ministry representatives actually have lawful access to the camera recordings, since they already appear to know the exact footage to request. According to GYLA, this indicates the illegal acquisition and processing of personal information by the Ministry of Internal Affairs without legal grounds.

GYLA has repeatedly called on the Personal Data Protection Service to examine whether a prior data protection impact assessment was carried out, whether actions taken with the data are properly documented, whether organizational and technical security measures comply with applicable law, whether access to information stored in the special electronic program is legally justified, and whether access levels align with personal data protection standards.¹²² The service's final decision on this issue is still unknown.

It is noteworthy that 112 cameras on Rustaveli Avenue are being selectively used as evidence against protest participants, as confirmed by the criminal case of Tornike Toshkhua and Mindia Shervashidze, which GYLA is monitoring. On August 18, during the first presentation session, the defendants indicated that the "victim" had been on Rustaveli Street with a cold weapon, which then fell and was taken by police officers as evidence under the influence of the protesters. The defense lawyer noted the serial number, which was not visible in the prosecutor's submitted materials. According to the prosecutor, there was no trace of a cold weapon in the case. Interestingly, the state failed to effectively use the video recordings, which should have shown the circumstances described by the lawyer and defendants, including the police sealing the knife. Despite the prosecutor's initial assertion that the knife was absent from the case, the sealed knife appeared in updated case materials. This circumstance should have been evident in the full video recording from the beginning, yet the prosecutor presented only a cut version of the footage.¹²³

¹¹⁵ GYLA calls on the Personal Data Protection Service to study the practice of using facial recognition cameras by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 10.02.2025 see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/saia-mowodeba-sheswavlil-ignes-amomcnobi-kamerebis-gamoyenebis-praqtika>, [14.11.2025].

¹¹⁶ GYLA, Ministry of Internal Affairs uses facial recognition technologies for total control against peaceful demonstrators, 12.03.2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/saxis-amomcnobi-kamerebi-saia>, [14.11.2025].

¹¹⁷ *GLUKHIN v. RUSSIA*, 11519/20, European Court of Human Rights, 2023.

¹¹⁸ OSCE ODIHR, Urgent Opinion on the Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code of Georgia (as adopted on 16 October 2025), Opinion-Nr.: FOPA-GEO/564/2025 [ALC/TN], para 97. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/601503>, [18.11.2025].

¹¹⁹ Ibid

¹²⁰ Ibid

¹²¹ Ibid

¹²² GYLA calls on the Personal Data Protection Service to study the practice of using facial recognition cameras by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 10.02.2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/saia-mowodeba-sheswavlil-ignes-amomcnobi-kamerebis-gamoyenebis-praqtika>, [14.11.2025].

¹²³ Netgazeti, Tornike Toshkhua and Mindia Shervashidze sentenced to detention, 18.08.2025, <https://netgazeti.ge/life/782951/> [09.12.2025].

CHAPTER 4. CRIMINAL JUSTICE

In 2025, politically motivated justice was one of the most alarming trends. As a result of GYLA's court monitoring, a total of 147 activists and politicians¹²⁴ were charged under criminal law in connection with the protests of 2024–2025, including 66 individuals arrested after the events of October 4, 2025. Through the observation of approximately 300 ongoing court hearings involving 69 individuals, GYLA identified significant violations and prepared a special report on these findings.¹²⁵ Monitoring of criminal cases in first-instance courts showed that the use of criminal prosecution mechanisms against activists is aimed not only at preventing specific possible crimes but also at exerting pressure on the rights to freedom of assembly and expression. Observation of all cases is ongoing.

4.1. Criminal Justice in the Context of Freedom of Assembly

In total, 12 politicians and 137 protesters were indicted on various charges during 2024-2025.

4.1.1. Criminal cases from spring 2024 to September 2025

The results of monitoring the cases of 69 individuals (including 3 women) detained in the context of the protests since the spring of 2024, and the protests following November 28, 2024 (as of September 2025) reveal the following:

Activists are mostly charged with crimes such as organizing or participating in group violence; preparing an explosion; attacking a police officer; damaging or destroying an object by setting it on fire, exploding it, or using other dangerous means; illegally manufacturing, producing, purchasing, storing, transporting, or forwarding a narcotic drug, its analogue, or precursor, especially in large quantities; attempting to block a strategic facility, etc.

▪ Preventive measures

In criminal cases against individuals detained in connection with protests, the court almost always imposed the most severe form of preventive measure, **imprisonment**, at the initial stage. Judges granted the prosecutor's motions without taking into account the defendants' circumstances, such as their personal characteristics, activities, age, health, family situation, property status, or other relevant factors.

According to GYLA, the unjustified, long-term detention of activists did not serve the legitimate purposes of preventive measures. Instead, imprisonment was requested and applied as a tool to punish and/or exert pressure on protest participants.

The results of court monitoring conducted by GYLA for years¹²⁶ have shown that the use of detention as a preventive measure is not always used only in extreme cases. In practice, two problematic issues emerge with regard to detention: the high rate of use of detention and cases of unjustified detention.

▪ Cases of ill-treatment

Nineteen percent (13 individuals) of demonstrators detained under criminal law reported instances of ill-treatment during their trials. By their nature, these acts constitute violations prohibited by the Constitution of Georgia and international human rights treaties and are punishable under criminal law. Depending on the circumstances, these acts may amount to torture, the threat of torture, or degrading or inhuman treatment, as provided for in Articles 144¹, 144², and 144³ of the Criminal Code.

The individuals who reported ill-treatment include Saba Skhvitaridze, Revaz Kiknadze, Nikoloz Katsia, Anatoli Gigauri, Davit Khomeriki, Davit Lomidze, Temur Zasokhasvili, Archil Museliantsi, Anastasia Zinovkina, Artem Gribuli, Tevdore Abramov, Aleksandre Elisashvili, and Mzia Amaglobeli.

Several defendants also highlighted issues within the penitentiary institutions, including excessive heat and poor ventilation, the presence of cockroaches, problems with water and sewage, and insufficient medical care.

¹²⁴ See the attached table for details.

¹²⁵ GYLA, Results of the observation of politically motivated cases of persons arrested in the context of protests in the first instance courts in 2024-2025, 2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/en/post/GYLA-politikuradmotivirebulisaqmeebis-monitoringi>, [14.11.2025].

¹²⁶ All GYLA criminal justice monitoring reports, spanning 15 years of monitoring experience, are available on GYLA's website- www.gyla.ge.

Investigations into these cases of ill-treatment have been ineffective. The Special Investigation Service at the time, and subsequently the Prosecutor's Office after the Service's abolition on July 1, 2025, failed to identify the responsible individuals. Out of the 13 affected persons, only Saba Skhvitardze was granted victim status; the remaining 12 are not recognized as victims by the Prosecutor's Office.

- **Publicity of proceedings**

In 2025, challenges to the transparency and publicity of criminal proceedings became particularly acute. During the initial stages of criminal cases against activists, publicity was limited due to the arbitrariness of individual judges and/or by holding trials in small courtrooms, which prevented interested parties from attending the sessions. Subsequently, media coverage of the trials faced further restrictions, and the legal framework governing court transparency deteriorated.

With the amendments to the Organic Law of Georgia on General Courts, media access to court sessions was effectively curtailed (see Chapter 2 for details). **The provision allowing video and audio recording, as well as broadcasting, only with the decision of the High Council of Justice for each specific session, proved ineffective in practice.** Despite numerous requests from media outlets to cover court hearings in the activists' criminal cases, the High Council of Justice failed to respond.

Problems were also observed regarding the public dissemination of information about the hearings. Information on criminal cases against demonstrators was not consistently posted on the court's website or on designated monitors within the court building.

- **Right to Defence**

One of the challenges in the ongoing cases against activists was the restriction of the right to defense in several instances.

In a criminal case involving eleven individuals, the judge, without any legal basis, mandatorily appointed a public defender for all defendants. Except for one defendant, all defendants' private lawyers were present at the hearings and explicitly stated that they did not wish to involve a new lawyer. There were no legal grounds for appointing public defenders in this case, and preventive appointment of a public defender is not recognized under criminal procedural law. Moreover, the element of trust between a defendant and their lawyer is fundamental. The relationship between lawyer and client is primarily based on trust, and in this case, the defendants had private lawyers engaged specifically for this purpose.

Problems related to interpreters were also observed in cases against demonstrators. A lack of qualifications or significant deficiencies in the translation process directly restrict the rights of the accused, particularly regarding effective defense and the principle of a fair trial. When an accused cannot fully understand the proceedings against them—including the formulation of the charges, the assessment of evidence, and witness testimony—they are unable to adequately express their position or exercise their defense rights.

Instances were documented in which the defense reported that the interpreter's translation did not serve the interests of the accused and was, in some cases, significantly inadequate or inappropriate. These challenges involved both the quality of translation and violations of neutrality and ethical standards, creating substantial barriers to the full participation of the accused in the proceedings and the effective realization of their right to defense.

- **Judgments and punishments**

The approach of the prosecution and judicial authorities to ongoing criminal cases against activists has been predominantly strict, which was **reflected in the high number of guilty verdicts and the imposition of prison sentences.**

All criminal cases against activists resulted in guilty verdicts, except for those of Giorgi Akhobadze, Tevdore Abramov, and Nikoloz Katsia, who were acquitted by the court.

In several cases, the court reclassified the charges brought against the defendants. Specifically, in the cases of Anatoly Gigauri and in the so-called eight- and eleven-person cases, judges reclassified the charges to lighter provisions. In one instance — the case of Saba Skhvitardze — the prosecutor's office itself changed the qualification: instead

of the offence under Article 353(2) of the Criminal Code (assault on a police officer), the charge was amended to Article 120 (intentional minor injury to health).

The charges against Mzia Amaglobeli, the founder of *Batumelebi* and *Netgazeti*, were likewise reclassified: instead of Article 353 of the Criminal Code (attack on a police officer or other government official or public institution), the judge applied Article 353¹ (resistance, threat, or violence against a defender of public order or other government official).

The court imposed prison sentences on 8 out of 10 persons detained on criminal charges during the protests against the so-called Russian law. As for those detained in the context of the November–December 2025 protests, all convicted individuals, without exception, received fixed-term imprisonment.

Hearings in the ongoing drug-related cases against activists at the Tbilisi City Court revealed that, in most instances, no neutral evidence was presented, and in some cases the neutrality of those designated by the prosecution as “**neutral witnesses**” was questionable. Moreover, video evidence was not submitted, even in situations where it would have been possible to request recordings from the external perimeter showing the search and seizure process. In some cases, the video evidence that *was* presented raised further questions regarding the conduct of the search.

▪ **Presumption of innocence**

According to observations by the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, in the period preceding the verdicts in the ongoing cases against activists, several public statements were made by high-ranking government officials that violated the presumption of innocence. It is particularly noteworthy that these political officials were not parties to the proceedings and therefore should not have had access to information about the evidence in the criminal cases. Their statements¹²⁷ not only infringed the presumption of innocence but also served to mislead the public and create negative perceptions of the accused by disseminating false information. Moreover, such statements could be perceived as an indirect instruction to the court to issue decisions aligned with the preferences of the ruling team.

▪ **Criminal Justice Policy of the Prosecutor’s Office**

Criminal prosecution may also not be initiated or may be terminated if it contradicts the guiding principles of criminal justice policy. In this regard, the Order of the Minister of Justice of Georgia No. 181 of October 8, 2010, on the approval of the general part of the guiding principles of criminal justice policy, establishes the principles and recommendations that must guide prosecutorial decision-making. Within the limits of discretionary powers, the prosecutor must assess, on the basis of these principles, whether initiating prosecution in a particular case is appropriate.

The Strategy Document of the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia for 2022–2027 likewise states that “[...] in order to pursue a uniform criminal justice policy, recommendations will be developed and updated on the initiation of criminal prosecution, the use of preventive measures, the conclusion of plea agreements, the use of discretionary powers, and other relevant issues of prosecutorial activity. In order to apply the recommendations in practice and determine their effectiveness, the implementation of the recommendations will be periodically monitored [...]”.¹²⁸

However, after the adoption of the Strategy Document, instead of indications of positive progress in criminal justice policy, the situation has significantly deteriorated in several areas. It should also be noted that even prior to this, progress concerning the use of discretionary powers was minimal — in practice, this component has long remained merely an “effective” legislative formulation, which rarely functions as a genuinely effective legal instrument in the hands of the ordinary prosecutor.

Furthermore, by **abolishing the Special Investigation Service**, the Georgian Dream has once again demonstrated that it does not intend to effectively investigate police violence and ill-treatment, fulfill its obligations under the

¹²⁷ Radio Liberty, [Mzia Amaglobeli sues Kobakhidze, Mdinardze and Subari for defamation](#), 07.05.2025, see Mzia Amaglobeli sues Kobakhidze, Mdinardze and Subari for defamation, [14.11.2025]; Georgian News, [Irakli Kobakhidze reiterated that Mzia Amaglobeli was carrying out a “specific order”](#), 10.07.2025, see Irakli Kobakhidze reiterated that Mzia Amaglobeli was carrying out a “specific order”, [14.11.2025]; Mtis ambebi, Ivanishvili’s Prime Minister’s false statements about Mzia Amaglobeli, 17.05.2025, see <https://www.facebook.com/mtisambebi/videos/8991738330928136/>, [14.11.2025].

¹²⁸ Strategy of the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia (2022–2027), p. 16, see [php6EGZ3a.pdf](#), (available In Georgian) [14.11.2025].

EU association process, implement the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, or take into account the recommendations of the Venice Commission. **Alarmingly, no criminal prosecution has been initiated against any individual for the violence committed against activists and journalists during the protests.**

4.1.2. Criminal cases after October 4, 2025

The number of criminal cases increased after the events of October 4.

In the context of October 4, criminal investigations began against 66 people (4 of them women) have been arrested under criminal law. They are mostly accused of organizing group violence, attempting to seize and block strategic and special-importance facilities as a group, and resisting the police.

▪ Cases of ill-treatment

Four of the detainees alleged ill-treatment, namely Davit Zhgenti, Tornike Mchedlishvili, Vakhtang Pitskhelauri and Amiran Dolishvili, who reported violence, physical abuse and threats, including threats of rape. See details below:

Tornike Mchedlishvili stated at the trial that after his arrest, when he was taken from Gurjaani, he was subjected to severe verbal abuse, swearing, and threats, including threats of harm to health, and there was even a threat of rape.¹²⁹

Vakhtang Pitskhelauri stated that his rights were violated during his arrest, he was arrested twice, first administratively and then criminally. There was violence and insults, including towards his family. He was dragged out of the car, dragged a certain distance, hit in the shoulders three times, and threatened, “Don’t stand next to Burchuladze, you’ll see now.”¹³⁰ Vakhtang Pitskhelauri had scratches on his hands and body. According to his lawyer, there was a kidnapping, Vakhtang Pitskhelauri was not explained his rights during his arrest, nor was he given a copy of the arrest report, and he had visible injuries, including bruises on his arms, shoulders, and elbows.¹³¹

According to **David Zhgenti**, he was beaten by a Special Tasks Department employee both during and after his arrest.¹³² Lawyer Lasha Tsutskiridze explained that Special Tasks Department officers took Zhgenti to the Presidential Palace and that he was subjected to physical violence by several individuals inside the Palace, not only during the arrest process but also afterwards.¹³³ According to lawyer Omar Purtseladze, the defendant was initially detained under administrative procedures and was subsequently charged under criminal law. Zhgenti sustained injuries to his eye socket, head, neck, arms, back, and chest.¹³⁴

Amiran Dolishvili noted that during his arrest, special forces beat him at home.¹³⁵

¹²⁹ The first 13 arrested in the “October 4 case” - who are they, what did they do wrong?, Radiotavisuleba, 09.10.2025, available at: <https://www.radiotavisuleba.ge/a/%E1%83%9E%E1%83%98%E1%83%A0%E1%83%95%E1%83%94%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98-13-%E1%83%93%E1%83%90%E1%83%99%E1%83%90%E1%83%95%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%A3%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98-4-%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A5%E1%83%A2%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9B%E1%83%91%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%A5%E1%83%9B%E1%83%94%E1%83%96%E1%83%94/3355590.html>, [13.11.2025].

¹³⁰ “The trial of detainees in the October 4 case, Radio Liberty’s Facebook page, 08.10.2025, available at: <https://www.facebook.com/radiotavisuleba/posts/pfbid06Je1yyA4og2cdh2yQAYjxb97rwLzVcgvfUYk769XtyYNVJNRTc4WmmCfBD8LJ5rj>, [13.11.2025].

¹³¹ According to the lawyer, this happened during administrative detention.

¹³² “The court sentenced four more participants of the October 4 rally to prison,” Radio Liberty, 08.10.2025, available at: <https://www.radiotavisuleba.ge/a/33554610.html>.

¹³³ “They took him to the presidential palace and physically assaulted him - David Jgentis’ lawyer” TV Pirveli, 07.10.2025, available at: <https://typirveli.ge/ka/siaxleebi/sazogadoeba/111765-shekvanes-prezidentis-sasakhleshi-da-pizikurad-gaustsordnen-davit-jgentis->, [13.11.2025].

¹³⁴ The first 13 arrested in the “October 4 case” - who are they, what did they do wrong?, Radiotavisuleba, 09.10.2025, available at: <https://www.radiotavisuleba.ge/a/%E1%83%9E%E1%83%98%E1%83%A0%E1%83%95%E1%83%94%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98-13-%E1%83%93%E1%83%90%E1%83%99%E1%83%90%E1%83%95%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%A3%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98-4-%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A5%E1%83%A2%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9B%E1%83%91%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%A5%E1%83%9B%E1%83%94%E1%83%96%E1%83%94/3355590.html>, [13.11.2025].

¹³⁵ “Trial of detainees in the October 4 case”, Radio Liberty, 11.10.2025, available at: <https://www.facebook.com/radiotavisuleba/posts/pfbid02Jw7KYodE7JRCuyA3y6kpBf23w1sKDKUBBUZve7bbAEKwfcyQhU4E4znuv5muTcI>, [13.11.2025].

- **Use of preventive measures**

As for the types of preventive measures used, the prosecution and the court still have strict approaches in the October 4 cases and mostly sentenced the defendants to imprisonment. In particular, bail was used only against three individuals - Ia Darakhvelidze, Mariam Mekantsishvili and Giorgi Chakhunashvili.¹³⁶ In all three cases, the prosecutor's office itself requested the so-called pre-trial bail, and the court satisfied it.

One of the noteworthy circumstances concerns the obstruction of journalistic activity. Seven individuals were arrested on charges of hindering the work of journalists. According to the charges, on 4 October 2025, during a protest rally on Atoneli Street and in the surrounding area in Tbilisi, the defendants unlawfully obstructed the camera crews of the Public Broadcaster, Imedi TV, and Rustavi 2 by spraying pepper spray, physically preventing them from carrying out their work, and threatening them with violence.

Six defendants were charged under Article 154(1) of the Criminal Code of Georgia for illegal interference with a journalist's professional activities, namely coercing journalists to disseminate or refrain from disseminating information. One defendant was charged under Article 154(2), which concerns the same unlawful interference committed through threats of violence.

In contrast, no criminal charges were initiated in relation to the obstruction of several critical and independent media outlets during 2024–2025, despite incidents involving physical attacks and harm to journalists' health.¹³⁷

4.2. Other criminal cases of high public interest

The Georgian Dream has turned the so-called investigative commission cases into another mechanism for persecuting political opponents. In particular, on 5 February 2025, the Georgian Dream-dominated parliament established a temporary investigative commission tasked with examining the activities of the government in power between 2003–2012, political officials of that period, and current and former officials affiliated with political parties from 2003 onward.¹³⁸ On 1 April 2025, the parliament expanded the commission's mandate to cover the period 2012–2025.¹³⁹

According to the explanatory note, the purpose of the commission's activities was to assess the crimes allegedly committed by the then-ruling regime and its political officials during 2003–2012, and to place their decisions within a legal framework.¹⁴⁰

The activities of the commission are problematic in several respects, which in fact calls its legitimacy into question—particularly given the already-disputed legitimacy of the legislative body itself. It is noteworthy that the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament directly imposes a duty of justification on the initiators of an investigative commission.¹⁴¹ Accordingly, the initiators of the current commission were required to fully and comprehensively substantiate not only the purpose and necessity of establishing the commission, but also the framework and modalities of its work. In reality, the explanatory note failed to provide complete information regarding the specific issues to be investigated, the reasons for their selection, the individuals to be questioned, and the documentation to be examined during the proceedings. Instead, the explanatory note was limited to general statements about the 2003–2012 period and offered only vague explanations of the relevance of the investigative topics. At the same time, it referred to the alleged threats posed by the “radical opposition,” asserting that “they pose a decisive obstacle to the establishment of a healthy political system in Georgia.”¹⁴²

¹³⁶ Doctor Giorgi Chakhunashvili released after paying bail, Radio Liberty, 11.10.2025, available at: <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33557005.html>, [13.11.2025].

¹³⁷ “Journalist Guram Rogava has broken facial bones and a fractured neck,” Radio Liberty, available at: <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33220188.html>, [13.11.2025].

The Times dedicates extensive article to uninvestigated case of attack on Maka Chikhladze and Giorgi Shetsuri, TV Pirveli, 31.12.2025, available at: [The Times dedicates extensive article to uninvestigated case of attack on Maka Chikhladze and Giorgi Shetsuri](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-times-dedicates-extensive-article-to-uninvestigated-case-of-attack-on-maka-chikhladze-and-giorgi-shetsuri) | TV Pirveli, [13.11.2025].

¹³⁸ Resolution of the Parliament of Georgia of February 5, 2025 N 240-II06-XI03.

¹³⁹ Official website of the Parliament of Georgia, Amendments to the Resolution on the Temporary Investigative Commission of the Parliament, 01.04.2025, see https://parliament.ge/media/news/parlamentis-droebiti-sagamodziebo-komisiis-shesakheb-dadgenilebashi-tsvlileba-gank-hortsielda?fbclid=IwY2xjawJ_6JZleHRuA2FlbQlxMABicmlkETFicjllZFhUT05yUkU1VkZ2AR7JvVh5z2AXaU_61zwGSGFLpWnxWwbR0ippb4KAQf-gQ--HgCjDfe2hjxc3t3g_aem_6-3FfzsSoTTHIVng2V4PLg, [14.11.2025].

¹⁴⁰ Explanatory note on the draft resolution of the Parliament of Georgia “On the establishment of a temporary investigative commission to investigate the activities of the regime and its political officials in 2003-2012”.

¹⁴¹ Article 62, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Georgia.

¹⁴² Ibid

However, based on the information provided, it is unknown what immediate threat existed regarding the aforementioned individuals in the criminal proceedings against them.

Although the investigative commission, as a temporary body of the parliament, is inherently political and does not have such a high standard of legal proof as ordinary investigative agencies, it, as an independent and impartial state body accountable to the people and the parliament, has a standard of justification, at least based on the fact that its conclusion may serve as a basis for the legal liability of specific individuals or parties. The need for justification is one of the procedural stages in the process of creating a commission.¹⁴³ Given the paucity of justification for the need to create a commission, it is likely that the purpose of the commission's activities was not to conduct a real investigation of crimes committed by state officials, but to prepare an appropriate legal and political basis for the banning of specific political parties, which the leaders of the Georgian Dream openly spoke about.¹⁴⁴ However, the activities of the investigative commission cannot in themselves be directed against specific political party(ies) or towards their banning.¹⁴⁵

In addition to the lack of justification, the composition of the commission was also problematic. According to the Constitution, opposition members must constitute at least half of the members of investigative or other temporary commissions.¹⁴⁶ This requirement entails not only a formal distribution of seats but also the meaningful involvement of parliamentary minorities in the commission's actual work. The participation of opposition representatives in the sessions of a temporary investigative commission is essential to ensure transparency, balance, and objectivity. However, the composition of the current investigative commission was dominated solely by the parliamentary majority and the so-called "opposition" groups, which entered parliament through the Georgian Dream's election list.¹⁴⁷ Accordingly, their presence on the commission cannot be regarded as genuine opposition involvement and appears to have been merely formal.

In general, the temporary investigative commission has the authority to summon any person and request a written explanation regarding the issue under investigation. This authority, in practice, is essential for the proper performance of the commission's investigative function; without it, the commission would be unable to thoroughly examine the matter and reach an objective conclusion. A significant issue that arose during the commission's activities was the failure of some individuals to appear when summoned. Leaders of opposition parties, despite being requested, did not attend the commission sessions and did not submit written explanations. In response, the commission forwarded information regarding these individuals to the Prosecutor General's Office for their failure to comply.¹⁴⁸

GYLA considers that failure to appear before the commission cannot be classified as a criminal offense. In particular:

Sanctions for non-compliance with a request of the Parliamentary Investigative Commission are provided both in the Code of Administrative Offenses and in the Criminal Code. Article 1733 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of Georgia stipulates that failure to comply with a lawful request of the Temporary Investigative Commission of the Parliament of Georgia is punishable by a fine of fifty minimum wages. Article 349 of the Criminal Code provides similar content, allowing for a fine, imprisonment of up to one year, or deprivation of the right to hold a position or engage in activity for up to three years. This creates a situation where the same act can be assessed as both an administrative violation and a criminal offense.

Since the legislator does not clarify which norm takes precedence when identical provisions exist in normative acts of equal legal force, the matter must be assessed in accordance with the Constitution of Georgia and international standards. In case of doubt, the less restrictive norm should apply (*in dubio pro libertate*).

¹⁴³ For more details on the issue, see GYLA, Activities of the Temporary Investigative Commission of the Georgian Dream Parliament. 21.05.2025, <https://shorturl.at/lqtaL>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁴⁴ Civil.ge, The bill initiated by the "Georgian Dream" envisages "declaring the successor parties of the National Movement unconstitutional", 28.03.2025, see <https://civil.ge/ka/archives/672285>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁴⁵ von Münch/Kunig/Groh, 7. Aufl. 2021, GG Art. 44, Rn. 22-28.

¹⁴⁶ Article 42, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Georgia.

¹⁴⁷ The members of the commission are: from the faction "Georgian Dream" (5 members): Tea Tsulikiani (Chairman), Aleksandre Tabatadze, Tengiz Sharmanashvili, Aluda Ghudushauri, Paata Salia (later Irakli Kadagishvili), from the political group "People's Power" (2 members): Sozar Subari (Secretary), Guram Macharashvili, from the political group "European Socialists" (1 member): Ilia Injia, as well as 2 members determined by quotas from non-factional deputies (namely, from the party "Gakharia for Georgia", which refused to enter the parliament). See the decision of the Bureau of the Parliament of Georgia "On the approval of the number of members and quotas for proportional representation in the Temporary Investigative Commission of the Parliament of Georgia to investigate the activities of the current regime and political officials of the regime in 2003-2012".

¹⁴⁸ A total of 8 people: Badri Japaridze, Mamuka Khazaradze, Irakli Okruashvili, Nika Gvaramia, Zurab Girchi Japaridze, Giorgi Vashadze, Nikanor Melia, Giorgi (Givi) Targamadze.

It is also noteworthy that the offense under Article 349 falls into the category of minor crimes, with a maximum penalty of one year's imprisonment. Both the elements of the offense and the prescribed punishment indicate that the act is not sufficiently dangerous to society to justify prioritizing criminal prosecution. Determining the extent of liability should be guided by considerations of public danger, minimal intervention, proportionality, and legal foreseeability.

The principle of proportionality requires that any restriction of rights by the state be fair, necessary, justified, and not exceed what is required to achieve the legitimate aim. Legal foreseeability ensures that citizens can anticipate the consequences of their actions and is a fundamental safeguard of human rights. In this case, it is unclear how a person would be held liable, violating this principle.

Despite these considerations, representatives of the Georgian Prosecutor's Office, exercising their discretionary powers, made a decision that ignored the existence of the administrative norm, as well as applicable domestic and international standards.

When deciding whether to initiate criminal prosecution, the prosecutor must apply two tests: the evidentiary test and the public interest test. Together, these constitute the so-called "complete test," which must be satisfied before prosecution can be lawfully initiated.¹⁴⁹ It is publicly known that a number of individuals have been charged under the above-mentioned article.¹⁵⁰ A central legal problem in these cases concerns the legitimacy of the commission and the absence of a clear legal basis for its actions. Even assuming the existence of a reasonable presumption standard, the prosecutor must still consider the public interest, assessing how high a priority the prosecution of a specific alleged crime is for the state. This consideration is particularly critical in light of the Georgian Prosecutor's Office's prolonged inaction regarding individuals allegedly involved in organized crimes of torture, reflecting a disregard for the real public interest.

In addition, the Prosecutor's Office has brought new charges against eight politicians.¹⁵¹ According to the Prosecutor General,¹⁵² a joint investigation conducted by the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia, the State Security Service, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs has initiated criminal proceedings against Mikheil Saakashvili, Giorgi Vashadze, Nika Gvaramia, Nikanor Melia, Zurab "Girchi" Japaridze, Elene Khoshtaria, Mamuka Khazaradze, and Badri Japaridze. They are accused of committing crimes against the state, including sabotage, aiding and abetting hostile activities on behalf of a foreign country, financing actions aimed at undermining Georgia's constitutional order and national security, and calling for the violent overthrow of the constitutional order and the government.

Levan Khabeishvili, chairman of the political council of the "United National Movement," is currently in custody. According to the Prosecutor's Office, he systematically issued public calls—on television and social media—offering to pay USD 200,000 in bribes to employees of the Special Tasks Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs if they refused to participate in training and exercises, failed to perform their official duties, or declined to use the special means lawfully at their disposal when required. Khabeishvili also publicly promised to pay the same large sum as a bribe to any police officers who would provide information or confidential materials related to their official activities.

The investigation accuses him of offering a bribe in exchange for the commission of an illegal act, as well as of calling for the overthrow of the state government.¹⁵³

On 12 November 2025, Giorgi Gakharia was charged with organizing the intentional infliction of serious harm to the health of more than two persons and with abuse of official authority by a person holding a state political position in

¹⁴⁹ Order No. 181 of the Minister of Justice of Georgia of October 8, 2010 on Approval of the General Part of the Guiding Principles of Criminal Justice Policy.

¹⁵⁰ The Prosecutor's Office has filed charges against Mamuka Khazaradze, Irakli Okruashvili, Zurab Girchi Japaridze, Giorgi (Givi) Targamadze, Nika Gvaramia, Giorgi Vashadze, Nikanor Melia and Badri Japaridze for failing to comply with the lawful request of the Temporary Investigative Commission of the Parliament of Georgia. The charges are provided for under Article 349 of the Criminal Code.

¹⁵¹ Mikheil Saakashvili is charged under Article 317 of the Criminal Code of Georgia- with the fact of calling for a violent change of the constitutional order of Georgia or the overthrow of the state government. Zurab Girchi Japaridze and Giorgi Vashadze are charged under Article 318, Part 1 and Article 319 of the Criminal Code of Georgia- with the fact of sabotage and assistance in activities hostile to a foreign country. Elene Khoshtaria is charged under Article 318, Part 1, Article 319 and Part 1 of Article 321, Prima of the Criminal Code of Georgia- with the fact of sabotage, provision of material resources for the above-mentioned crime and assistance in activities hostile to a foreign country. Nika Gvaramia, Nikanor Melia, Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze are charged under Article 318, Part 1 of the Criminal Code of Georgia- sabotage.

¹⁵² Statement of the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia, 06.11.2025, see pog.gov.ge- სიახლეები, [14.11.2025].

¹⁵³ "The Prosecutor's Office has charged two individuals with promising a bribe in exchange for committing an illegal act, calling for the overthrow of the state government, and obstructing the investigation", Prosecutor's Office of Georgia, 13.09.2025, pog.gov.ge- სიახლეები, [14.11.2025].

connection with the events of 20–21 June 2019.¹⁵⁴ Gakharia is also accused of intentionally exceeding the scope of his official authority in the so-called *Chorchana episode*. According to the Prosecutor’s Office, his actions caused a substantial violation of the legitimate interests of society and the state.¹⁵⁵

As is publicly known, the investigation into the events of 20–21 June has been ongoing for years. It is therefore important to understand what new circumstances the investigative body has discovered six years after the incident that could serve as the basis for the charges against Giorgi Gakharia—and, if such evidence exists, why it could not have been identified earlier. This case is noteworthy not only in terms of Gakharia’s potential culpability, but also in terms of evaluating the effectiveness of the long-running investigation.

The statement released by the Prosecutor’s Office regarding the so-called Chorchana episode adds a tragicomic dimension to the activities of the investigative bodies. It is difficult to imagine that a Minister of Internal Affairs could commit an act of the gravity described in the charges, and that it would take six years for the investigative body to respond. A separate issue requiring clarification and assessment is the legal classification of the alleged offence, including why the decision to erect an additional police checkpoint along the occupation line on the territory of Georgia would amount to a violation of the legitimate interests of society and the state.

The current practice of intensively using criminal law mechanisms against opposition party leaders undermines the interests of the administration of justice and serves the purpose of political persecution.

¹⁵⁴ Statement of the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia, 12.11.2025, see Statement, [18.11.2025]. <https://pog.gov.ge/news/prokuraturam-parlamentis-mimdebare-teritoriaze-gamartuli-saprotesto-aqtsiis-mimdinareobisas-orze-meti-piris-mimart-janmrtelobis-ganzrakh-mdzime-d-azianebis-organizebis-da-sakhelmtsifo-politikuri-tanamdebobis-mqone-piris-mier-samsakhurebrivi-uflebamosilebis-gadametebis-faqtebze-gi-orgi-gakharas-mimart-siskhlissamartlebrivi-devna-daitsko-5227>

¹⁵⁵ Ibid

CHAPTER 5 - THE RIGHT TO LIFE

Alleged violations of the right to life during the reporting period were linked to the State's failure to fulfil its positive obligations, its indifference to threats arising from the environment and infrastructure, and the absence of adequate preventive measures.

Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights imposes a positive obligation on the State to protect the lives of individuals within its jurisdiction,¹⁵⁶ encompassing both substantive and procedural aspects of regulatory measures.¹⁵⁷ The State also has a positive obligation to take preventive operational steps,¹⁵⁸ with the public's right to receive information being particularly significant among these preventive measures.¹⁵⁹ Positive obligations under the right to life require States, inter alia, to adopt regulations ensuring the safety of individuals in public spaces and to secure the effective functioning of this regulatory framework.¹⁶⁰ When no intentional act of State agents is involved, State responsibility is assessed based on whether the State took all measures reasonably available to avert risks to human life¹⁶¹ and whether the authorities knew or should have known about the mortal danger.¹⁶²

On 25 January, a 16-year-old teenager fell into a ditch in Rike Park in Tbilisi, near the "Rike Jugs," and died.¹⁶³ Tbilisi City Hall responded to the incident by noting that it occurred on privately owned property.¹⁶⁴ However, the mere fact that a particular area is privately owned does not relieve the State of its obligation to take measures against such threats—especially in public spaces—given that various groups, including children, may be particularly vulnerable to these risks.¹⁶⁵

According to citizens, the area was an open space with no warning signs indicating any danger, and the site was demarcated with yellow and red tape only after the tragedy occurred.¹⁶⁶ Media reports indicate that this was not the first incident in which a person had fallen into the ditch. This demonstrates that the State should have been aware of the existing hazard and therefore had both the opportunity and the obligation to take appropriate preventive measures to avert such an incident.¹⁶⁷

Public sources indicate that the Ministry of Internal Affairs initiated an investigation under Article 115 of the Criminal Code (incitement to suicide);¹⁶⁸ however, the results of the investigation remain unclear, and the public still does not know what circumstances led to the incident.

On February 15, two young children died after falling into a water-filled ditch in the so-called "City of Dreams" area (near Fr. Khalvashi Avenue N188).¹⁶⁹ According to locals,¹⁷⁰ the area was neither fenced off nor equipped with warning signs that would have clearly informed adults or children of the danger. Media reports indicate that a fence

¹⁵⁶ *Cevrioglu v. Turkey*, 69546/12, European Court of Human Rights, 2016, §50.

¹⁵⁷ *Öneryıldız v. Turkey* [GC], 48939/99, European Court of Human Rights, 2004, § 89-118.

¹⁵⁸ *ibid* §101.

¹⁵⁹ *ibid* § 89.

¹⁶⁰ *Ciechońska v. Poland*, 19776/04, European Court of Human Rights, 2011, § 69.

¹⁶¹ Report of the Public Defender of Georgia on the State of Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in Georgia in 2024, 2024, 30, see <https://www.ombudsman.ge/res/docs/2025091211433999093.pdf>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁶² *ibid*

¹⁶³ Radio Liberty, "We let go of our hands and it fell in" - Who is responsible for the death of a teenager at the "Rike Dokebi"?, 30.01.2025, see <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98%E1%83%A7%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%93%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A5%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%97%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C-%E1%83%9B%E1%83%9D%E1%83%96%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%93%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%93%E1%83%90%E1%83%A6%E1%83%A3%E1%83%9E%E1%83%95%E1%83%90%E1%83%96%E1%83%94-%E1%83%9E%E1%83%90%E1%83%A1%E1%83%A3%E1%83%AE%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1%E1%83%9B%E1%83%92%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%94%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98/33297459.html>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁶⁴ Tbilisi City Hall statement, 29.01.2025, see <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/17AAHYPSQ/>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁶⁵ *CEVRİOĞLU v. TURKEY*, 69546/12, European Court of Human Rights, § 67.

¹⁶⁶ TV Pirveli, "Tragedy in Tbilisi- An VIII grade student fell into an open ditch in Rike Park and died", 29.01.2025, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XKWFOilgvVI>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁶⁷ *ibid*

¹⁶⁸ Radio Liberty, 16-year-old boy killed in the area of "Rike Dokebi", 29.01.2025, <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33295247.html>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁶⁹ Batumi residents, Nana Kvachadze, "Investigation launched into the death of two children in the "City of Dreams", 16.02.2025, see https://batumelebi.netgazeti.ge/news/562541/?fbclid=IwY2xjawleKX1leHRuA2FlbQlxMAABHfjbaLlpN-OHypZAJGyir3CgpTpvzjnAfXRhVKn-AqiC1snoutRV58x1PA_aem_97VzASbvQPuBdF7561NGKg [14.11.2025]; Batumi City Hall statement, 15.02.2025, see <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=975345798049541&set=a.249247530659375>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁷⁰ Broadcaster, "Two children fell into a ditch and died in the territory of the "City of Dreams", 16.02.2025, see <https://www.facebook.com/mautskebeli.ge/videos/425841007223352/?rclid=a2ypSyGU6imlGrTx#>, [14.11.2025].

had existed on the site one week earlier, on February 8, but only for a single day in connection with the launch of construction of new buildings, an event attended by officials of the “Georgian Dream” party.¹⁷¹ By the following day, February 9, the fence had already been dismantled;¹⁷² only after the tragedy was the ditch fenced off. Ajara’s Minister of Finance and Economy, Jaba Putkaradze, stated at the scene that only pre-construction preparatory works had been underway in the “City of Dreams” area, which, in his view, explained why the territory was not fenced off. According to him, an “appropriate fence” would be installed once full construction works commenced.¹⁷³

GYLA examined the construction organization project signed with LLC “Anaghi,” which had won the tender announced by the Ajara Ministry of Finance and Economy. The explanatory note to the project states: “The construction works are divided into two stages—preparatory works and main construction works. The cycle of preparatory works begins with arranging the construction site: (1) placing appropriate warning banners at the entrance to the territory; (2) installation of temporary fences and booths for workers; (3) storage of construction materials,”¹⁷⁴ among other measures.

According to one of the locals, he had previously pointed out and protested the dangers posed by the dug pits, but instead of responding to these concerns, the authorities fined him.¹⁷⁵ This further underscores that the state should have been aware of the imminent danger and taken appropriate preventive measures. According to Batumelebi,¹⁷⁶ the Ministry of Internal Affairs has launched an investigation under Article 116 of the Criminal Code – Negligent Killing.¹⁷⁷

On July 14, 2025, two people died due to the collapse of the facade of a residential building on Tevdore Mghvdi Street, at Station Square. Another person sustained injuries and was taken to a medical facility. Information about the dangers posed by this building had been publicly available prior to the incident.¹⁷⁸ In particular, on March 30, 2024, a citizen published a video on social media showing the building’s condition, and footage of the cracks had also been recorded in October 2022. In the video, the citizen stated that he had repeatedly contacted City Hall without success.¹⁷⁹

GYLA requested information from the Tbilisi City Hall, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, and the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia regarding the collapse of the residential building on Station Square.¹⁸⁰ Specifically, the request sought to clarify: which agency or service is directly responsible for the prevention and control of incidents involving dilapidated buildings; what normative acts or documents guide its activities; what preventive measures the Tbilisi City Hall implemented both before and after the incident; whether the material damage caused by the collapse was assessed; whether any compensation was provided to affected persons; how long the building had been monitored prior to the collapse; what investigative actions were carried out; whether relevant examinations were appointed and completed; whether the responsible person(s) were identified; which body of the Prosecutor’s Office manages the procedural investigation; whether anyone was charged or recognized as a victim; and what procedural instructions the prosecutor issued for conducting the investigation. Neither the Tbilisi City Hall nor the Ministry of Internal Affairs responded to these inquiries. The Prosecutor General’s Office of Georgia replied late and provided only lim-

¹⁷¹ Batumelebi, Jaba Ananidze, “The security fence in the “City of Dreams” to protect Kobakhidze was only there for one day”, 17.02.2025, see <https://batumelebi.netgazeti.ge/news/562660/>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁷² *ibid*

¹⁷³ Tabula, “This was not a construction area” - Minister of Economy of Adjara on the incident in the “City of Dreams”, 16.02.2025, see <https://tabula.ge/ge/news/730284-es-ar-iko-samsheneblo-teritoria-acharis> [14.11.2025].

¹⁷⁴ Electronic Tender Announcement Number NAT240025327, “Construction Organization Project”, Rules and Methods of Work Production, 3, 2022.

¹⁷⁵ Formula, “3 and 6-year-old children died in an accident in the so-called City of Dreams in Batumi”, 16.02.2025, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsGQPuzhY80>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁷⁶ batumelebi, Nana Kvachadze, “2 children fell into a water-filled ditch and died in the “City of Dreams”, 15.02.2025, see https://batumelebi.netgazeti.ge/news/562534/?fbclid=IwY2xjawlekwleHRuA2FlbQlMQABHeVOjRriZ3vYHf-zLlg61rzIXN3TH7Y1m4eHAAwEiwLtr7wS682Sl-aMw_aem_NjYx-di_7HGpHK3wd4H14w [14.11.2025].

¹⁷⁷ is punishable by house arrest for a term of six months to two years or by imprisonment for a term of two to four years. The same act committed against two or more persons shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to five years.

¹⁷⁸ Radio Liberty, Search work completed at the site of the collapse of the building near the “Station Square”, 15.07.2025, see, <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33474080.html>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁷⁹ Radio Liberty, Casualties Resulted from Collapse Near Station Square, 15.07.2025, see https://www.youtube.com/shorts/j6_MwosYYn0, [14.11.2025].

¹⁸⁰ Letters of GYLA, dated September 30, 2025, requesting information from Tbilisi City Hall (Letter N 8-04/55-25), Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia (Letter N 8-04/56-25) and Prosecution Service of Georgia (Letter N 8-04/57-25).

ited information,¹⁸¹ stating that the investigation is being conducted by the 2nd Division of the Main Investigation Department of the Tbilisi Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, that the alleged crime falls under Part 2 of Article 240 of the Criminal Code of Georgia, and that procedural supervision of the investigation is carried out by the Prosecutor's Department of the Tbilisi Prosecutor's Office. The response also indicated that no summary decision has been made in the criminal case.

These facts indicate, on the one hand, a disregard for the right to access public information, a failure to uphold the principles of transparency and accountability, and, on the other hand, the lack of prioritization of issues related to the violation of the right to life in the context of the investigation.

¹⁸¹ Letter N 13/77048 of Prosecution Service of Georgia dated October 28, 2025.

CHAPTER 6 - PROHIBITION OF TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT

A significant problem in 2025 was the state's failure to comply with its positive and negative obligations to prohibit torture and ill-treatment. In addition to the failure to investigate the systematic and mass torture that occurred in late 2024, the state in some cases condoned the use of ill-treatment against people involved in protests.

6.1. State-sponsored mistreatment

The State continued to employ police violence and ill-treatment against protesters during the February 2, 2025, protest near Tbilisi Mall. During the dispersal of the protest, the then-head of the Special Tasks Department physically assaulted a detainee in front of video cameras.¹⁸² Of the 25 people detained at the protest who were visited by the Public Defender's Office, 22 reported ill-treatment.¹⁸³ It is particularly noteworthy that police were especially aggressive towards women during the protest, including beating and slapping them and using sexist and misogynistic language.¹⁸⁴

In 2025, there were also cases in which persons detained under administrative or criminal law reported that, after detention, they were forcibly and completely undressed under the pretext of a personal search or examination.¹⁸⁵ This degrading practice serves no legitimate purpose, violates CPT standards,¹⁸⁶ and places individuals in a vulnerable, humiliating, and degrading situation.

Furthermore, in the context of ongoing protests in 2025, additional cases of ill-treatment of detainees were reported (see Section 4.1).

6.2. Ineffective investigation into torture and ill-treatment of protest participants

In 2025, those responsible for the torture and ill-treatment of protest participants remain unpunished. Investigations into these crimes have been ineffective, largely due to a lack of political will to identify and hold accountable the perpetrators.

On 20 December 2024, in response to the alarming human rights violations in Georgia during November–December 2024, the 38 OSCE participating States activated the Vienna Mechanism.¹⁸⁷ This instrument allows participating States to raise questions with other States regarding human rights protection.¹⁸⁸ The questions directed at Georgia specifically concerned the effectiveness of investigations into rights violations related to the protests and the measures taken to prevent similar incidents.¹⁸⁹ In 2025, GYLA submitted alternative reports to the Vienna Mechanism

¹⁸² Netgazeti Facebook page, Zviad Kharazishvili (Khareba) kicks a citizen at the moment of arrest, 02.02.2025; see https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=search&v=1021389913360020&external_log_id=4437867b-5a1f-49da-a54c-4bcbf2f631da&q=%E1%83%AE%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%90%20%E1%83%AB%E1%83%90%E1%83%9A%E1%83%90%E1%83%93%E1%83%9D%E1%83%91%E1%83%A1 [14.11.2025]. Radio Liberty, Man Fined 2,000 GEL for Telling How "Khareba" Kicked Him, 04.02.2025, see <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33303099.html> [14.11.2025].

¹⁸³ Report of the Public Defender of Georgia on the State of Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in Georgia in 2024, 2025, p. 89; see <https://www.ombudsman.ge/res/docs/2025091211433999093.pdf> [14.11.2025].

¹⁸⁴ Radio Liberty, Police Indecency and Violence Against Female Demonstrators", 07.02.2025; see https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33306780.html?fbclid=IwY2xjawlW4PlleHRuA2FibQlXMQABHaA-B2VKg-Pas7msrghY-KfEPe1TTgHwPEt3d_ofb0t5ye-y39Q4xZ6aQ_aem_WSIKm3SVkRh-CCXegsTzb-A, [24.10.2025]; Social justice center, Misogynistic and Sexist Culture and Language Has Increased in the Police, 11.02.2025; see <https://socialjustice.org.ge/ka/products/politsiashi-gazrdilia-mizoginiuri-da-seksisturi-kultura-da-ena>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁸⁵ Amnesty International, FROM INSULTS TO ASSAULTS: WEAPONIZING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN PROTESTORS IN GEORGIA, 2025, see <https://eurasia.amnesty.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/from-insults-to-assaults-police-violence-towards-women-protestors-in-georgia.pdf>, [14.11.2025]; GYLA responds to the unacceptable practice of stripping detainees, 29.03.2025, see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/saia-exmianebe-dakavebulta-gashishvleblis-dausjvebel%20praqtikas>, [14.11.2025]; GYLA responds to the developments in the Gela Khasaias case on October 1, <https://gyla.ge/post/gela-khasaias-saqme-GYLA>, [30.10.2025].

¹⁸⁶ According to the Council of Europe's Committee against Torture (CPT), strip searches should not be carried out as an automatic or arbitrary practice. Such searches should be based on an assessment of the individual's risk, subject to strict supervision and pre-established standards. When it is necessary to carry out a strip search, the detainee should not be required to remove all of his or her clothing at once and should be given the opportunity to first remove the upper part of his or her body, then put on the rest of his or her clothing and then remove the remaining clothing. See CPT/Inf (2025) 11, <https://rm.coe.int/1680b4e6af>, [14.11.2025]; See also: GYLA responds to the unacceptable practice of stripping detainees, 29.03.2025, <https://www.gyla.ge/en/post/saia-exmianebe-dakavebulta-gashishvleblis-dausjvebel%20praqtikas>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁸⁷ U.S. Mission OSCE, Invocation of the Vienna (Human Dimension) Mechanism on the Situation in Georgia, 20.12.2024, see <https://osce.usmission.gov/invocation-of-the-vienna-human-dimension-mechanism-on-the-situation-in-georgia/>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁸⁸ OSCE, Vienna Mechanism, see <https://www.osce.org/odihr/20064>, [14.11.2025].

¹⁸⁹ U.S. Mission OSCE, Invocation of the Vienna (Human Dimension) Mechanism on the Situation in Georgia, 20.12.2024, see <https://osce.usmission.gov/invocation-of-the-vienna-human-dimension-mechanism-on-the-situation-in-georgia/>, [14.11.2025].

on three occasions.¹⁹⁰ These reports highlighted challenges in the investigation of violations, referencing standards established by the European Court of Human Rights in its 20 June 2019 case, as well as systemic deficiencies in investigations and the deterioration of the legislative framework governing such inquiries.

Until its abolition on 1 July 2025, the Special Investigation Service (SIS) was responsible for investigating crimes committed by law enforcement officers, including violence against protesters and journalists. Despite its mandate, the SIS failed to identify or hold accountable any police officers responsible for acts of violence.¹⁹¹

A documentary report published in May 2025, prepared by 11 Georgian civil society organizations, identified numerous problems covering the period from November 2024 to February 2025. The report confirms the ineffectiveness of the investigation into police violence against demonstrators. Key issues included the consolidation of hundreds of crimes into a single case,¹⁹² misclassification and incomplete qualification of offenses,¹⁹³ difficulties in obtaining video recordings from security cameras and police buildings,¹⁹⁴ and the loss or destruction of crucial evidence.¹⁹⁵ Additional problems involved inaction at crime scenes¹⁹⁶, failure to inspect individual incident sites, delayed collection of evidence essential to the cases, and insufficient public accountability.¹⁹⁷ Failure to initiate an investigation into publicly disseminated information containing signs of a crime without direct contact with the victim.¹⁹⁸ The parliamentary report of the Public Defender also confirmed the investigation's ineffectiveness.¹⁹⁹

Publicly available photo and video materials, as well as interviews with participants in the protests and reports from state agencies, confirm that the uniforms of the undercover police officers who participated in the crackdown on the protests in November-December 2024 and on February 2 did not have identification marks, which in turn is a violation of the standard established by the European Court of Human Rights.²⁰⁰ The Special Investigation Service used this circumstance as an argument for the impossibility of identifying the perpetrators. In fact, the absence of identification marks cannot be an argument justifying impunity.²⁰¹ The Special Investigation Service should have used alternative investigative measures to identify the perpetrators, which was also pointed out by the European Court of Human Rights in its decision regarding the June 20, 2019 protest rally,²⁰² *Tsaava and Others v. Georgia*.²⁰³

The use of chemical irritants by the police against demonstrators in November–December 2024 has remained without an effective investigation. According to reports, exposure to these substances caused significant health damage to some victims. In several cases, individuals required intensive medical treatment in the following months, and the health conditions resulting from exposure to chemical agents substantially affected their daily lives and ability to carry out professional activities during this period.²⁰⁴ Police forces also used unknown chemical irritants mixed into water cannons.²⁰⁵ Notably, according to information obtained from the Ministry of Health in January 2025, the

¹⁹⁰ Information from Civil Society Organization Submitted to the OSCE Vienna (Human Dimension) Mechanism Prepared by Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA) January 21, 2025, see https://admin.gyla.ge/uploads_script/publications/pdf/Alternative%20Information%20from%20GYLA%20to%20Vienna%20Mechanism.pdf [14.11.2025]; Follow up on Civil Society Organization Submission to the OSCE Vienna (Human Dimension) Mechanism Prepared by Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA), Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI) and Rights Georgia, April, 2025, see https://admin.gyla.ge/uploads_script/publications/pdf/Alternative%20Information%20from%20GYLA%20to%20Vienna%20Mechanism.pdf, [14.11.2025].

¹⁹¹ GYLA, The abolition of the Special Investigation Service confirms that the Georgian Dream does not even formally intend to investigate torture and police violence 23.05.2025; see <https://gyla.ge/post/specialuri-sagamodziebos-gauqmeba> [14.11.2025].

¹⁹² GYLA et al., Human Rights Crisis in Georgia Following the 2024 Parliamentary Elections, November 28, 2024–February 28, 2025, 2025, p. 137.

¹⁹³ Ibid 137-138.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid 138-139.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid 140.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid 140.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid 141.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid 141.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid 79. see <https://www.ombudsman.ge/res/docs/2025040121291438156.pdf>, [14.11.2025].

²⁰⁰ Ibid see <https://gyla.ge/post/chapkutis-danomrva-17ivlisis-sasamartlo>, [14.11.2025].

²⁰¹ TV Pirveli, Up to 300 beaten and tortured people and not a single punished executioner - Karlo Katsitadze in front of "Saturday Broadcast", 21.12.2024; see https://tvpirveli.ge/ka/siaxleebi/politika/89868-300-mde-natsemi-da-natsamebi-adamiani-da-artserti-dasjili-jalati-karlo-katsitadze?fbclid=IwY2xjawH1uCFleHRuA2FlbQixMQABHwL2rfCh8aJ_9YBy7ZJfxXAN2BPPUXvblJizDPZoiQ43_REO6ce8iT2g_Q_aem_Tco6XNUVLY-cJckwidjX6Ew [14.11.2025].

²⁰² The Judgement of the European Court of Human Rights, *Tsaava and Others v. Georgia*, nos. 13186/20, 07.05.2024.

²⁰³ GYLA, Information from Civil Society Organization Submitted to the OSCE Vienna (Human Dimension) Mechanism, 2025; see https://admin.gyla.ge/uploads_script/publications/pdf/Alternative%20Information%20from%20GYLA%20to%20Vienna%20Mechanism.pdf [14.11.2025].

²⁰⁴ GYLA, The use of chemical agents by the Georgian Dream against peaceful demonstrators in November-December 2024 was illegal and dangerous to health, 02.05.2025; see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/demosntaciebis-dashla-ucnobi-qimiurishenaerti> (In Georgian), [02.12.2025]; see also GYLA et al., The human rights crisis in Georgia after the 2024 parliamentary elections, 28 November 2024–28 February 2025, 2025.

²⁰⁵ Ibid

Ministry has no information about the composition of the chemicals and did not request such information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs “due to the lack of need.”²⁰⁶

On December 1, 2025, the BBC published a journalistic investigation alleging that the state used bromobenzyl cyanide (Camite) mixed with water cannon to disperse the 2024 protests.²⁰⁷ According to the BBC, this substance is particularly dangerous.²⁰⁸ It was used as a chemical weapon during the First World War and was soon abandoned by states due to its long-lasting effects.²⁰⁹ The findings of this investigation are of serious concern and require an objective and thorough inquiry.

The State Security Service issued a statement indicating that an investigation had been launched under both abuse of official authority (Article 333 of the Criminal Code) and assistance to a foreign organization in hostile activities (Article 319).²¹⁰ Within the framework of this investigation, individuals who were respondents to the BBC report or appeared in it, including GYLA employees, were summoned for questioning.²¹¹ The absence of an effective investigation into systemic human rights violations, coupled with the wording used in this case, raises strong suspicions that the aim is not to establish the truth but to exert pressure on those individuals and organizations that speak out about systemic human rights abuses.²¹² (For information on the summons for questioning, see section 1.4.)

In addition, regardless of the composition of the chemical agents used by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the methods and practices of their use were clearly illegal and posed serious risks to health and life. These actions require an effective response from the state, yet no meaningful steps were taken in 2025.²¹³

It is noteworthy that no criminal prosecutions have been initiated against law enforcement officers in cases of violence where the faces of the police officers are visible and easily identifiable.²¹⁴ This practice confirms the state's intention not to investigate and hold accountable police officers who abuse peaceful protesters and journalists.

6.3. Deterioration of institutional mechanisms related to the investigation of torture

On June 24, 2025, the Georgian Dream adopted a law abolishing the Special Investigation Service (SIS) as of July 1, transferring its functions to the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia.²¹⁵ The SIS was established to investigate crimes and ill-treatment committed by law enforcement officers, a mandate arising both from Georgia's obligations under the “Association Agenda between Georgia and the European Union for 2017–2020”²¹⁶ and the implementation of Euro-

²⁰⁶ ოკუპირებულ ტერიტორიებიდან დევნილთა, შრომის, ჯანმრთელობისა და სოციალური დაცვის სამინისტროს 2025 წლის 19 თებერვლის MOH 7 25 00192431 წერილი. იხილეთ საია et al., ადამიანის უფლებების კრიზისი საქართველოში 2024 წლის საპარლამენტო არჩევნების შემდგომ, 2024 წლის 28 ნოემბერი-2025 წლის 28 თებერვალი, 2025, დანართი.

²⁰⁷ BBC, WW1 toxic compound sprayed on Georgian protesters, BBC evidence suggests, 01.12.2025, იხ. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czrk7g50e1po>, [02.12.2025]; BBC, Did Georgian police use a chemical weapon against protesters? - BBC World Service Documentaries, 01.11.2025, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z4-koO916Gk&t=133s>, [04.12.2025].

²⁰⁸ Ibid

²⁰⁹ Ibid

²¹⁰ According to the statement of the service, “As of today, we can only consider as an established fact that, on the one hand, the disseminated material contains signs of a crime, which, if confirmed, is directed at the life and health of citizens, substantially violates their and society's legitimate interests, and on the other hand, on the contrary, contains signs of a crime that grossly harms the national interests of Georgia, its international image, reputation, and is directed at infringing on state interests.” Statement of the State Security Service of December 1, 2025, see <https://ssg.gov.ge/news/1058/sus-shi-gamodzieba-daitsyo-BBC-is-mier-sajaro-sivrceshi-danashaulis-shesaxe-b-gavrcelebul-informaciastan-dakavshirebit>, [02.12.2025].

²¹¹ GYLA, State Security Service Summons GYLA Employees for Questioning in Connection with the BBC Investigative Film, 02.12.2025, <https://gyla.ge/post/GYLA-BBCsagamodziebopilmi-gamokitxvazedabareba>, [04.12.2025]; also, Radio Liberty, TI Director Eka Gigauri, as well as Dr. Gogi Chakhunashvili, co-author of the study, summoned by the State Security Service due to an interview with the BBC, 03.12.2025, <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33611641.html>, [04.12.2025].

²¹² GYLA, State Security Service Summons GYLA Employees for Questioning in Connection with the BBC Investigative Film, 02.12.2025, <https://gyla.ge/post/GYLA-BBCsagamodziebopilmi-gamokitxvazedabareba>, [04.12.2025];

²¹³ GYLA, The use of chemical agents by the Georgian Dream against peaceful demonstrators in November-December 2024 was illegal and dangerous to health, 02.05.2025; see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/demosntaciebis-dashla-ucnobi-qimiurishenaerti>, (in Georgian) [02.12.2025]; see also GYLA et al., The human rights crisis in Georgia after the 2024 parliamentary elections, 28 November 2024–28 February 2025, 2025.

²¹⁴ Public Defender of Georgia, Report on the Status of Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in Georgia for 2024, 78; see <https://www.ombudsman.ge/res/docs/2025091211433999093.pdf> [14.11.2025].

²¹⁵ „On Amendments to the Organic Law of Georgia “On the Prosecutor's Office”, document number 693-III-XI, see <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/6534876?publication=0>, [14.11.2025].

²¹⁶ ASSOCIATION AGENDA BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GEORGIA 2017-2020, see <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TX/?qid=1525315497163&uri=CELEX:22017D2445>, [14.11.2025].

pean Court of Human Rights decisions in the Tsintsabadze group of cases.²¹⁷

Even before its abolition, the SIS faced criticism for lacking sufficient independence from the Prosecutor's Office. For years, international institutions—including the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,²¹⁸ the European Commission,²¹⁹ and the Venice Commission²²⁰ urged Georgia to strengthen the agency's independence. In June 2025, the Committee of Ministers specifically called on Georgia not to abolish the SIS.²²¹

To date, the SIS has been largely ineffective in fulfilling its responsibilities, contributing to impunity for perpetrators of police violence, torture, and inhuman treatment. The abolition of the agency underscores the Georgian Dream's continued refusal to meaningfully investigate police violence.

²¹⁷ The Tsintsabadze Group brings together 18 judgments of the European Court of Human Rights concerning violations of the right to life and the prohibition of torture, which were caused by the actions of police and prison officials and their ineffective investigations. See <https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/#%7B%22fulltext%22:%22tsintsabadze%22,%22execdocumenttypecollection%22:%22CEC%22,%22execidentifier%22:%22004-5830%22%7D>, [14.11.2025].

²¹⁸ 1492nd meeting (12-14 March 2024) (DH)- H46-14 Tsintsabadze group v. Georgia (Application No. 35403/06), see [https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/#%22execidentifier%22:%22CM/Del/Dec\(2024\)1492/H46-14E%22%7D](https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/#%22execidentifier%22:%22CM/Del/Dec(2024)1492/H46-14E%22%7D), [14.11.2025].

²¹⁹ Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, 2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy (extract about Georgia), see https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/2023-communication-eu-enlargement-policy-extract-about-georgia_en, [14.11.2025].

²²⁰ Venice Commission, Opinion No. 1158/2023, CDL-AD(2023)044, par. 146, see [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=C-DL-AD\(2023\)044-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=C-DL-AD(2023)044-e), [14.11.2025].

²²¹ Decision of the Committee of Ministers on the Tsintsabadze Group of Cases, 1531st meeting, 10-12 June 2025 (DH) see <https://rm.coe.int/0900001680b64842>, [14.11.2025].

CHAPTER 7 - THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY

The right to equality remained a serious challenge in 2025. On one hand, the state, by creating a hostile environment for civil society, undermined mechanisms that are crucial for vulnerable groups to self-organize, engage in public life, advocate for their rights, or access services. On the other hand, state actions themselves reinforced inequality, including by perpetuating gender-based stereotypes.

Laws targeting civil society in Georgia have a broad impact on the right to equality and the prohibition of discrimination. While the Constitution of Georgia and relevant legislative acts—such as the Law on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination and the Labor Code—guarantee equality before the law, the practical realization of these rights depends heavily on the active participation of civil society organizations.²²² These organizations play a vital “public watchdog” role, provide essential services, ensure access to justice for diverse groups, and offer effective legal protection in cases of discrimination. Civil society organizations also serve as an important means for communities to self-organize and bring issues relevant to their constituencies to the public agenda. However, a hostile environment toward civic engagement—including the imposition of the “foreign agent” label and restricted access to resources—undermines public trust in these organizations, prevents individuals and groups from pursuing civic initiatives, and limits access to legal and advocacy support. In this way, the law indirectly weakens equality rights by disabling the actors responsible for promoting and enforcing them. **This has a clear negative impact on religious and ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, the elderly, women, children, and other vulnerable groups.**

The “monitoring” conducted by the Anti-Corruption Bureau under the Law on Grants has once again underscored the risks such legislation poses to the rights of vulnerable groups. In June 2025, when the Bureau requested organizations to provide information on their beneficiaries—including sensitive data—this placed at risk the protection of confidential information, particularly concerning women and children who had experienced violence and were receiving support from these organizations.²²³ Notably, the organizations refused to provide such information to the Bureau. It is also significant that the UN **Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC)** issued an interim measure regarding a minor beneficiary of the organization *Safari*, calling on the state to refrain from requesting, disclosing, or transferring the child’s personal information to any party, including the Anti-Corruption Bureau.²²⁴ **Similarly, the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) issued a temporary measure protecting the personal data of another *Safari* beneficiary.**²²⁵

In 2025, the state continued to promote anti-gender narratives through both rhetoric and legislative changes, notably by completely removing the term “gender” from legislation.²²⁶ Such actions, along with the neglect of a gender perspective on violence and inequality, undermine years of efforts to combat gender-based violence. They disregard the social and cultural factors that contribute to violence against women, hinder the recognition of various forms of inequality, and obstruct the development of effective protection and support mechanisms. These measures also reinforce stereotypical roles for women and men, entrench a culture of inequality, and create conditions that normalize violence and hate speech.²²⁷ As a result, the country moves further away from the standards of the Istanbul Convention and perpetuates harmful stereotypes that **contribute to violence and discrimination against women.**²²⁸

²²² C/2023/861 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Civil society support and funding in the area of fundamental rights, the rule of law and democracy, Official Journal of the European Union, 08.12.2023. see <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52023IE1399>, [14.11.2025].

²²³ Netgazeti, correspondence, photo-video, information on beneficiaries – what is being demanded from 5 anti-corruption organizations, 18.06.2025, see <https://netgazeti.ge/life/777305/>, [14.11.2025].

²²⁴ Safari calls on the Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Court: Act legally and in accordance with Georgia’s international obligations, 24.07.2025, see <https://sapari.ge/sapari-calls-on-the-anti-corruption-bureau-and-the-court/>, [14.11.2025].

²²⁵ Publika, Safari: Another UN Committee Issues Temporary Measure on Non-Disclosure of Beneficiary’s Personal Information, 27.08.2025, see <https://publika.ge/safari-gaero-un/>, [14.11.2025].

²²⁶ The draft law “On Amendments to the Law of Georgia “On Gender Equality”, other draft laws on the removal of the word “gender” from the legislation and related documents can be found at the link: https://info.parliament.ge/?fbclid=IwY2xjawl1LdtleHRuA2FlbQlXMQABHSD_EyDLe-2qjVbWeU9d_8InyKIueb3VADONiaQw8zSFKe70TIWukJBCA_aem_BC1vWdKm4Y8M7r2tYV4U3g#law-drafting/30327, [14.11.2025].

²²⁷ Public Defender’s Statement “Public Defender’s Statement Regarding Increased Cases of Hate Speech Against Women and Minors”. 29.08.25. See <https://ombudsman.ge/geo/akhali-ambebi/sakhalkho-damtsvelis-gantskhadeba-kalebisa-da-arasrultslovanebis-mimart-sidzulvilis-enis-ga-khshirebul-shemtkhvevebtan-dakavshirebit> [14.11.2025].

²²⁸ GYLA, On March 8, 2025, Georgia faces a sharply deteriorating situation of women’s rights, 08.03.25 See <https://gyla.ge/post/2025-8-mar-ti-qalta-uflbebi-saia>, [14.11.2025].

This harmful trend was further exacerbated by law enforcement officers, who engaged in sexual harassment, gender-based abuse, and physical violence against women participating in peaceful protests.²²⁹ Such incidents were particularly frequent during the 2 February rally.²³⁰ Rather than protecting women from gender-based violence, the police themselves became perpetrators, leaving victims without protection and further eroding public trust.²³¹ The instrumentalization of law enforcement against female protesters not only constitutes a direct violation of their rights but also fosters a broader environment of vulnerability and reinforces systemic gender inequality in society.

The state also continued to fuel homophobic and transphobic hatred through its rhetoric.²³² A homophobic and transphobic legislative package remains in force, grossly violating the rights of the **LGBTQI community** and curtailing the space for the free and active expression of LGBTQI issues.²³³ Documentation of the November–December 2024 protests revealed homophobic and transphobic narratives underlying police violence. Individuals perceived by special forces to be associated with the LGBTQI+ community, based on certain characteristics, were subjected to harsher treatment.²³⁴ Yet, no one has been held accountable for these hate crimes, or for the broader patterns of torture and ill-treatment.

²²⁹ Amnesty International, FROM INSULTS TO ASSAULTS: WEAPONIZING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN PROTESTORS IN GEORGIA, 2025, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/georgia-women-protesters-are-targeted-with-escalating-violence-and-gender-based-reprisals/>, [14.11.2025].

²³⁰ Radio Liberty, “Tinder’s Assalarian Bozebo” - Police Indecency and Violence Against Female Demonstrators”, 07.02.2025; see https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33306780.html?fbclid=IwY2xjawlW4PlleHRuA2FlbQlxMQABHaA-B2VKg-Pas7msrghY-KfEPe1TTgHwPEt3d_ofb-0t5ye_-y39Q4xZ6aQ_aem_WSlKm3SVkRhCCXegsTzb-A [14.11.2025].

²³¹ GYLA statement “GYLA responds to the attack on the participants of the protest rally on Melikishvili Avenue on September 8, 2025.” 09.09.25. See <https://gyla.ge/post/8-setemberi-saas-shefaseba>, [14.11.2025].

²³² GYLA, Georgian Dream’s incitement of homophobia/transphobia is a tool of repression and authoritarian control, 17.04.2025, see <https://gyla.ge/post/Gancxadeba-17-maisi-gyla>, [14.11.2025].

²³³ *ibid*

²³⁴ *ibid*

CHAPTER 8 - ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

Amid ongoing political repression, economic, social and cultural rights remain a challenge in 2025. The following subsections discuss: the right to work; the right to decent housing; and the right to live in a healthy environment.

8.1. Workers rights

8.1.1 . Dismissal of civil servants

In 2025 (since late December 2024), a large-scale wave of dismissals in public institutions began. According to the trade union, more than 1,200 public servants were dismissed.²³⁵ This mass process was preceded by statements from Georgian Dream officials at the end of 2024 about “cleansing” the sector,²³⁶ as well as amendments to the Law on Public Service.²³⁷ Dismissal decisions were predominantly taken against individuals who did not share the ruling party’s position and had publicly expressed their civic views regarding the country’s European integration process. Public servants were dismissed without justification and through non-transparent procedures, typically under the pretexts of reorganization, disciplinary action, or contract expiration.²³⁸

In 2025, two important institutions, the Civil Service Bureau and the Parliamentary Research Center, were liquidated.²³⁹ Reorganization was carried out in the Parliament of Georgia²⁴⁰, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,²⁴¹ the Ministry of Defense,²⁴² the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth,²⁴³ the Tbilisi City Hall,²⁴⁴ and the Central Election Commission.²⁴⁵ The Special Investigation Service, the Inclusive Education Development Department within the Ministry of Education,²⁴⁶ the LEPL International Education Center, and the AIP Professional Skills Agency were also abolished.²⁴⁷ In November 2025, changes were announced, according to which the Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Personal Data Protection Service will be abolished from March 2, 2026.²⁴⁸

²³⁵ batumelebi, more than 1,200 civil servants were fired – “But the critical mood has not gone anywhere”, 16.09.2025, see https://batumelebi.netgazeti.ge/slideshow/587084/?fbclid=IwY2xjawOC9HJleHRuA2FlbQixMQBzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzIxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEzaH_WzbM7NkSW59uUIVeY_FjbPA7bog9MBPPqt7XjiUARhsY2cnbAvvy4mcM_aem_wXxzmvvy3n0H49BYFFt_Grw [14.11.2025].

²³⁶ GYLA, Pressure on public officials due to their legitimate protest is a criminal offense, 02.12.2024; see <https://gyla.ge/post/saguaro-mokhelee-bze-zewola-siskhlis-samartlis-danashaulia> [14.11.2025]. Also: Radio Liberty, Irakli Kobakhidze on the protest of public servants: “We will react to everyone’s actions”, 03.12.2024; see <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33224977.html> [14.11.2025]. Radio Svyatolieva, “We announced a reorganization last week...it’s lustration” - Kaladze responds to the protest of more than 200 City Hall employees, 01.12.2024; see <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33222551.html> [14.11.2025]. Formula, Tsilosani advises foreign ministry employees to “reflect on core values”, 29.11.2024; see <https://formulanews.ge/News/120680> [14.11.2025].

²³⁷ GYLA, Accelerated amendments to the Law on Civil Service serve to increase pressure on civil servants and further politicize the civil service, 16.12.2025, see <https://gyla.ge/post/sajaro-samsaxuris-shesaxebskanoni-cvlilebebi> [14.11.2025].

²³⁸ GYLA, The Destructive Effect of Civil Service “Reform”, 2025; see https://admin.gyla.ge/uploads_script/publications/pdf/THE%20DEVASTATING%20EFFECTS%20OF%20THE%20PUBLIC%20SERVICE%20%E2%80%9CREFORM%E2%80%9D.pdf [14.11.2025].

²³⁹ Ibid. Also: Radio Liberty, 21 more dismissed: Date of abolition of the Parliamentary Research Center announced, 06.02.2025; see <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/%E1%83%99%E1%83%98%E1%83%93%E1%83%94%E1%83%95-21-%E1%83%92%E1%83%90%E1%83%97%E1%83%90%E1%83%95%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1%E1%83%A3%E1%83%A4%E1%83%A9%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%A3%E1%83%A9%E1%83%98/33305429.html> [14.11.2025]; Interpressnews, Parliament supports the initiative to liquidate the Civil Service Bureau- the bureau will be liquidated from April 1, 2025, 20.02.2025; see <https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/830957-parlamentma-sajaro-samsaxuris-bi-uros-likvidaciis-iniciativas-mxari-dauchira-biuros-likvidacia-2025-clis-1-eli-aprilidan-ganxorcieldeba/> [14.11.2025].

²⁴⁰ Radio Liberty, “The staff list will change” - Shalva Papuashvili announced reorganization in the parliament, 07.04.2025; see <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33375961.html> [14.11.2025].

²⁴¹ GYLA, The Destructive Effect of the Civil Service “Reform”, 2025; see https://admin.gyla.ge/uploads_script/publications/pdf/THE%20DEVASTATING%20EFFECTS%20OF%20THE%20PUBLIC%20SERVICE%20%E2%80%9CREFORM%E2%80%9D.pdf [24.10.2025]. Also: Netgazeti, After the Reorganization, Several People Were Fired from the Foreign Ministry, 01.07.2025; see <https://netgazeti.ge/news/778600/> [14.11.2025].

²⁴² GYLA, The Destructive Effect of Civil Service “Reform”, 2025; see https://admin.gyla.ge/uploads_script/publications/pdf/THE%20DEVASTATING%20EFFECTS%20OF%20THE%20PUBLIC%20SERVICE%20%E2%80%9CREFORM%E2%80%9D.pdf [14.11.2025].

²⁴³ Pirveli TV, as part of the reorganization, several structural changes were made at the Ministry of Education, 24.10.2025; see <https://1tv.ge/news/reorganizaciis-farglebshi-ganatilebis-saministroshi-ramdenime-struqturuli-cvlileba-gankhorcielida/> [14.11.2025].

²⁴⁴ Tabula, Kaladze: There is a reorganization at the City Hall, many more people will be fired, 24.01.2025; <https://tabula.ge/ge/news/728959-ka-ladze-meriashi-reorganizatsiaa-kidev-bevri> [14.11.2025].

²⁴⁵ GYLA et al. Civil Society Organization, Human Rights Crisis in Georgia Following the 2024 Parliamentary Elections November 28, 2024- February 28, 2025, 2025, see https://admin.gyla.ge/uploads_script/publications/pdf/HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20CRISIS%20IN%20GEORGIA%20-%20final.pdf

²⁴⁶ GYLA, Abolition of the Special Investigation Service confirms that the Georgian Dream does not even intend to formally investigate torture and police violence, 23.05.2025; see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/specialuri-sagamodziebos-gauqmeba> [14.11.2025].

²⁴⁷ Pirveli TV, as part of the reorganization, several structural changes were made at the Ministry of Education, 24.10.2025; see <https://1tv.ge/news/reorganizaciis-farglebshi-ganatilebis-saministroshi-ramdenime-struqturuli-cvlileba-gankhorcielida/> [14.11.2025].

²⁴⁸ Civil Georgia, Anti-Corruption Bureau to Be Abolished in 2026, Audit Office to Absorb Its Functions, 17.11.2025, ob. <https://civil.ge/archives/710935> [04.12.2025].

The legislative amendments adopted by the Georgian Dream have made it easier to dismiss employees from public institutions. In December 2024, accelerated amendments to the Law of Georgia on Public Service weakened protection guarantees for persons employed in managerial positions and simplified the reorganization process.²⁴⁹ According to the European Commission, these amendments contradict Convention No. 158 of the International Labour Organization.²⁵⁰ Moreover, as noted in the report submitted by the Public Defender of Georgia to the European Committee of Social Rights, the amendments undermine previously existing legal guarantees that enabled public servants to effectively exercise their labor rights.²⁵¹

The deterioration of the legal status of persons employed in the public service continued with the adoption of subordinate legal acts in January 2025. By Order N582 of the Minister of Defense, the age limit for employees with special ranks in the military police became a ground for dismissal, resulting in mass layoffs. Meanwhile, Order N01-74 of the Minister of Foreign Affairs amended the Rules of the Diplomatic Service to allow managerial positions to be filled through administrative contracts, a practice that exceeds the scope of the law and increases the risk of political influence and arbitrary decision-making.²⁵²

Based on the amendments to the Law of Georgia “On Combating Corruption” adopted on 29 October 2025, a civil servant may carry out paid scientific, pedagogical, or creative activities only with the consent of the head of the relevant institution, granted for a specific period of time but not exceeding one year, and issued only once in writing. A civil servant may also hold an academic position only with the written consent of the head of the relevant institution for a defined period.²⁵³ These legislative changes further extend the ongoing repression in the public service, as civil servants, already deprived of adequate labor guarantees and particularly those expressing views different from the government, may now face additional restrictions on engaging in academic activities.

Beyond politically motivated repression and the deterioration of public servants’ rights, Georgia’s inconsistency with EU labor standards remains a significant challenge. Georgia has not yet ratified International Labour Organization conventions on labor inspection, safe and healthy working conditions, maternity protection, minimum wage, social security, or violence and harassment at work. Moreover, several labor rights provisions required under the European Social Charter also remain unimplemented.²⁵⁴

8.1.2. Violation of miners’ labor rights in Chiatura

The protection of miners’ labor rights in Chiatura was a problem. In January 2025, the Chiatura Management Company (CMC), the management company of the Chiatura manganese mining company, Georgian Manganese, suspended operations at the mines and transferred employees to partial pay.²⁵⁵ However, the miners were unable to receive even the 60% of their wages that the company was obligated to pay after the suspension of operations.²⁵⁶ According to the miners, the case involved 5,000 employees, more than 3,000 of whom worked in Chiatura.²⁵⁷ On March 7, Chiatura Management Company, in agreement with Georgian Manganese, issued a statement stating that

²⁴⁹ GYLA, The Destructive Effect of Civil Service “Reform”, 2025; see https://admin.gyla.ge/uploads_script/publications/pdf/THE%20DEVASTATING%20EFFECTS%20OF%20THE%20PUBLIC%20SERVICE%20%E2%80%99CREFORM%E2%80%99D.pdf [14.11.2025]. also GYLA et al. Civil Society Organization, Human Rights Crisis in Georgia Following the 2024 Parliamentary Elections November 28, 2024 - February 28, 2025, 2025, see https://admin.gyla.ge/uploads_script/publications/pdf/HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20CRISIS%20IN%20GEORGIA%20-%20final.pdf, [14.11.2025].

²⁵⁰ EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Georgia 2025 Report, 2025, 66; see https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/b3089ad4-26be-4c6a-84cc-b9d680fe0a48_en?filename=georgia-report-2025.pdf, [14.11.2025].

²⁵¹ Public Defender’s Office of Georgia, Comments regarding the 17th National Report on the implementation of the European Social Charter Submitted by the Government of Georgia, 2025, 7; see <https://rm.coe.int/comments-public-defender-georgia-17-nr-2025/1680b6bf66>, [14.11.2025].

²⁵² also GYLA et al. Civil Society Organization, Human Rights Crisis in Georgia Following the 2024 Parliamentary Elections November 28, 2024 - February 28, 2025, 2025, see https://admin.gyla.ge/uploads_script/publications/pdf/HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20CRISIS%20IN%20GEORGIA%20-%20final.pdf, [14.11.2025].

²⁵³ Law of the Republic of Georgia “On Amendments to the Law of Georgia “Fight against corruption”, document number 1015-IVMC-XIMΠ, see <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/6656740?publication=0#DOCUMENT:1>, [14.11.2025];

²⁵⁴ EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Georgia 2025 Report, 2025, 66; see https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/b3089ad4-26be-4c6a-84cc-b9d680fe0a48_en?filename=georgia-report-2025.pdf [24.10.2025].

²⁵⁵ Netgazeti, Miners end hunger strike, expect release of detainees in return, 21.05.2025, see <https://netgazeti.ge/news/774767/>, [14.11.2025]; Radio Liberty, Two miners on hunger strike in Chiatura again refuse medical assistance, their condition is critical, 04.06.2025, see <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33464015.html>, [14.11.2025];

²⁵⁶ Netgazeti, Miners end hunger strike, expect release of detainees in return, 21.05.2025, see <https://netgazeti.ge/news/774767/>, [14.11.2025]; Radio Liberty, Two miners on hunger strike in Chiatura again refuse medical assistance, their condition is critical, 04.06.2025, see <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/33464015.html>, [14.11.2025];

²⁵⁷ Netgazeti, Miners End Hunger Strike, Expect Release of Detainees in Return, 21.05.2025, see <https://netgazeti.ge/news/774767/>, [14.11.2025].

underground operations in Chiatura would not resume.²⁵⁸ Chiatura Management Company LLC, which mines manganese in Chiatura through underground and open-pit mining, has filed for bankruptcy with the Tbilisi City Court.²⁵⁹

This situation has led to an acute socio-economic crisis in the Chiatura municipality, as hundreds of miners employed by the company have been left without a basic income.²⁶⁰ Throughout 2025, the miners resorted to extreme forms of protest, including hunger strikes and face-slitting, and demanded a meeting with state representatives.²⁶¹

In addition, hundreds of miners were dismissed from their jobs as a result of an unlawful reorganization announced by the company.²⁶² On April 23, CMC stated that it planned to restore and reorganize mining operations in Chiatura, within the framework of which it proceeded to dismiss the miners involved in the protest.²⁶³

8.2. The right to adequate housing

Amid the repression of dissenters from the ruling party, social issues such as the right to adequate housing have become even more neglected. According to the Public Defender, there is no coherent state strategy for preventing homelessness, and both its causes and scale remain unstudied.²⁶⁴

The forced eviction of families from a building on Tvalchrelidze Street in Tbilisi on 24 July 2025 illustrates the severity and grave consequences of the state's lack of a homelessness policy, the inadequate protection of the rights of IDPs from the occupied territories, the disregard for the best interests of children, and the brutality of police methods. According to the Mayor of Tbilisi, Kakha Kaladze, the building was dilapidated and privately owned, and the eviction was a matter of enforcement and "not a municipal issue."²⁶⁵ While the state is obligated to protect the life and health of the population from the dangers posed by unsafe buildings, replacing the risk of living in a dilapidated structure with homelessness—leaving people equally vulnerable to threats to their lives, health, and dignity—cannot be seen as fulfilling that obligation.²⁶⁶

In addition, the eviction on Tvalchrelidze Street was carried out with a large mobilization of police forces and the use of disproportionate force. Footage shows individuals being held by the throat, pulled by their clothing, and placed into vehicles.²⁶⁷ According to the lawyer, a young man who was forcibly removed from his home was called a "princess" by police officers in an attempt to humiliate him.²⁶⁸ It is particularly alarming that this violent eviction unfolded in front of children. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Georgia is a party, affirms every child's right to a standard of living adequate for their physical, mental, spiritual, moral, and social development. It obliges the state to take necessary measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child in ensuring this right, including, where needed, through material support and housing-related programs.²⁶⁹ The violent nature of the eviction, as well as the resulting risk of homelessness for children, therefore constitutes a grave violation of children's rights.

²⁵⁸ Ibid

²⁵⁹ Ibid].

²⁶⁰ Social Justice Center, The State is Responsible for the Continuing Social Crisis in Chiatura, 06.03.2025, see <https://socialjustice.org.ge/ka/products/chiaturashi-shekmnil-gangrdzobit-sotsialur-krizisze-pasukhismgebeli-sakhelmtsifoa>, [14.11.2025].

²⁶¹ Social Justice Center, Extreme injustice and oppression have once again forced the miners of Chiatura to resort to extreme forms of protest and the most serious act of self-harm, 23.06.2030, see <https://socialjustice.org.ge/ka/products/ukiduresma-usamartlobam-da-chagvram-chiatureli-magharoelebi-kidev-ertkhel-aidzula-protestis-ukidures-formebs-da-tvitdazianebs-umdzimes-akts-mimarton>, [14.11.2025].

²⁶² Social Justice Center, The reorganization process in Chiatura is underway illegally and with serious violations of the miners' labor rights, 30.04.2025, see <https://socialjustice.org.ge/ka/products/chiaturashi-reorganizatsiis-protsezi-ukanonod-da-magharoelebis-shromiti-uflebebis-mdzime-darghvevebit-mimdinareobs>, [14.11.2025].

²⁶³ Netgazeti, Miners involved in protest fired from work, 20.05.2025, <https://netgazeti.ge/life/774525/>, [14.11.2025].

²⁶⁴ Public Defender of Georgia, Report of the Public Defender of Georgia on the State of Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in Georgia for 2024, 2025, 294; <https://www.ombudsman.ge/res/docs/2025091211433999093.pdf> [14.11.2025].

²⁶⁵ GYLA responds to the violent eviction of families on Tvalchrelidze Street and the subsequent detention process, 25.07.2025; see <https://www.gyla.ge/post/tvalchrelidzes-qucha-gamosaxleba-saia> [14.11.2025]. Also: Interpressnews, Kakha Kaladze - I am not going to go to Tvalchrelidze Street, this building is private property and the municipality has nothing to do with it - 9 of them are registered in Tbilisi, to whom we offered to provide rent, but only 2 agreed, 24.07.2025; see <https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/844647-kaxa-kalaze-tvalchrelizis-kuchaze-mis-vlas-ar-vapireb-es-shenoba-kerzo-sakutrebba-da-municipaliteti-araper-shuashia-matgan-9-ojacia-tbilisshi-registrirbuli-romeltac-kirit-uzrun-velfopa-shevtavazet-tumca-mxolod-2-datanxmda/>, [14.11.2025].

²⁶⁶ GYLA responds to the violent eviction of families on Tvalchrelidze Street and the subsequent detention process, 25.07.2025; see <https://gyla.ge/post/tvalchrelidzis-qucha-gamosaxleba-saia>, [14.11.2025].

²⁶⁷ TV Pirveli, Eviction in Tbilisi | Police forces mobilize on Tvalchrelidze Street, 24.07.2025; see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=205lcKeMfw4>, [14.11.2025].

²⁶⁸ Formula, Lawyer: Those detained at Tvalchrelidze were physically assaulted, the men were called "princesses", 25.07.2025; see <https://formulanews.ge/News/127626> [14.11.2025].

²⁶⁹ UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 27.

It is also noteworthy that the humiliating eviction occurred in parallel with administrative detentions. Representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs detained 17 people under Article 173 of the Code of Administrative Offenses for allegedly disobeying police orders, including residents of the building and individuals who had come to support them.²⁷⁰ These detentions once again underscore the repressive nature of the state's police forces.

8.3. The right to live in a healthy environment

The right to live in a healthy environment is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of Georgia, the fulfillment of which constitutes a positive obligation of the state.²⁷¹ This right entails not only preventing environmental pollution, but also taking active measures to protect the life and health of citizens in the face of natural or man-made threats. The heavy snowfall in Guria and Adjara and the landslides in the villages of Kharagauli municipality (Khemaghali and Ghverki) demonstrate that, in 2025, the *Georgian Dream* government remains unable or unwilling to fulfill its positive obligation to protect citizens' health, life, and safety.

During the heavy snowfall of February 2025, the measures taken by the local municipality proved ineffective given the scale of the disaster, leaving the local population to cope with the situation largely on its own. As a result, the homes of isolated residents collapsed, and several people lost their lives.²⁷²

According to media reports, as of 30 September 2025, approximately 68 hectares of land in the villages of Kharagauli Municipality have been affected by landslides.²⁷³ Residents in the affected areas are not provided with critical information necessary to protect their lives, health, and property. According to the residents, they are unaware whether a commission has been established at the local level to study the situation, and if it has, they do not know the commission's powers, tasks, or how effectively it addresses the needs of families impacted by the landslides. Furthermore, residents report that no authorized representative from the local municipality has visited them to assess and document their property, homestead plots, and household farms in detail. The Kharagauli Municipality City Hall advised affected families to arrange temporary housing on their own and provided only 1,000 GEL to families displaced by the landslides, covering rent for merely three months.

As a result of assessing potential threats during natural disasters, the state is obliged to take timely and adequate preventive measures. The right to life requires the state to take appropriate actions within its jurisdiction, including protection from threats that do not originate directly from the state. This includes measures to prevent loss of life during natural disasters, even when the events themselves are beyond human control.²⁷⁴ According to the Law on Civil Security of Georgia, municipalities are required to maintain a "municipal safety passport," which evaluates the risks of emergency situations, possible consequences, and preventive measures to be taken by the municipality. It is unclear whether all municipalities have such safety passports or whether they are accompanied by relevant risk-zoning maps. If safety passports do exist, they are not publicly accessible. Despite national legislation and international legal obligations, the state has for years failed to ensure adequate prevention and management of natural disasters, leaving people exposed to risks that the state is obliged to prevent or address effectively. The natural disasters in western Georgia highlight the state's failure to fulfill its positive obligations and demonstrate that the right to live in a healthy environment remains a serious challenge in the country.²⁷⁵

²⁷⁰ Interpressnews, The Ministry of Internal Affairs says that a total of 17 people have been detained under administrative law on Tvalchrelidze Street, 24.07.2025; see <https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/844713-shss-shi-axcadeben-rom-tvalchrelizis-kuchaze-administraculi-cesit-jamshi-17-piria-dakavebuli/> [14.11.2025].

²⁷¹ Constitution of Georgia, Article 29.

²⁷² Mtavari, Guria, a woman who was taking care of her elderly mother died in Natanebshi | Unable to visit family due to heavy snowfall- local media, Main Channel, 25.02.2025; see https://mtavari.tv/news/177569-guriashi-natanebshi-kali-gardaitsvala-romelits?fbclid=IwY2xjawlqeKFleH-RuA2FlbQixMQABHRRSBIzi1brsCnA7Hni4w9qyJLRx6ETGIB1_PxVmVG5t3P9z_kB4xW9x1Q_aem_4g1dVRTaoTF5nlbBD_toCg, [14.11.2025].

²⁷³ RadioLiberty, "PowerfulandExtremelyLarge"-WhatElseDoestheGeologicalReportontheKharagauliLandslideSay?, 30.09.2025; see https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/%E1%83%92%E1%83%94%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9A%E1%83%9D%E1%83%92%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98-%E1%83%AE%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%90%E1%83%92%E1%83%90%E1%83%A3%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%9B%E1%83%94%E1%83%AC%E1%83%A7%E1%83%94%E1%83%A0%E1%83%96%E1%83%94/33544828.html?fbclid=IwY2xjawO-CaEFleHRuA2FlbQixMQBicmlkETF6RXBwnZSWWFQakQ3dTFYc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjlyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHmwlit0PmlRWrcfjxs_gqsVbifeNC_vSCOastMY_tg26mckOgg5tFxfGBns_aem_V4ch5ERucenXkO4Eb5XOQ, [14.11.2025].

²⁷⁴ GYLA, Human Rights in the Face of Natural Disasters, Advocacy Document, 2023; see <https://gyla.ge/files/2020/%E1%83%99%E1%83%95%E1%83%9A%E1%83%94%E1%83%95%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98/untitled%20folder/%E1%83%9C%E1%83%98%E1%83%A3%E1%83%A1%E1%83%9A%E1%83%94%E1%83%97%E1%83%94%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98/HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20AND%20NATURAL%20DISASTERS.pdf> [14.11.2025].

²⁷⁵ GYLA in Georgia responds to the ineffective response of the state to heavy snowfall, 25.02.2025; see <https://gyla.ge/post/saia-didtovlobaze-saxelmwifos-araefeqtian-regirebas-exmaureba> [14.11.2025].

List of Criminal Cases Subject to Court Monitoring in 2024-2025

The presented information is given in the following order: Surname, First Name - Charge/ Type and Measure of Sentence - Type of measure of restraint/ Judgement - Court Instance:

The numbering indicated in the list of persons does not represent their priority arrangement and is used for technical purposes only.

I. The Cases Reflected in GYLA's Report of 23 October 2025:

1. Durglishvili Vazha - Article 187.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 2 years was considered conditional sentence - Tbilisi City Court.
2. Rautberg Andrei - Article 187.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Fine in the amount of 3000 GEL - Tbilisi City Court.
3. Shanidze Giorgi - Articles 187.1.; 265.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 4 years (He was pardoned by the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili) - Tbilisi City Court.
4. Megvinetukhutsesi Irakli - Article 353¹.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 5 years, restriction of the rights regarding weapons - Tbilisi City Court.
5. Okribelashvili Omari - Article 187.2.c. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 2 years and 6 months, of which 1 year was considered conditional sentence (He was released on the basis of serving the sentence) - Tbilisi City Court.
6. Meparishvili Saba - Article 187.2.c. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 2 years and 6 months, of which 1 year was considered conditional sentence (He was released on the basis of serving the sentence) - Tbilisi City Court.
7. Bubuteishvili Fridoni - Articles 187.1.; 353¹. 1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 5 years - Tbilisi City Court.
8. Okmelashvili Giorgi - Articles 353¹. 1.; 260.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 5 years - Tbilisi Court of Appeals.
9. Kuchuashvili Giorgi - Article 353¹.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 4 years - Tbilisi City Court.
10. Koldari Daviti - Article 187.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 2 years and 3 months - Tbilisi City Court.
11. G.M.(minor) - Article 187.2.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - In accordance with the legislation, the case was heard on closed hearings - Tbilisi City Court.
12. Mumladze Danieli - Article 187.2.c. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 3 years - Tbilisi Court of Appeals.
13. Khutashvili Gurami - Article 187.2.c. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 3 years - Tbilisi Court of Appeals.
14. Kulanin Denis - Article 187.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 2 years - Tbilisi Court of Appeals.
15. Chkhaidze Lasha - Article 187.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Fine in the amount of 1000 GEL and imprisonment for a term of 1 year - Tbilisi City Court.
16. Mate Davidze - Article 353¹.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 4 years and 6 months - Tbilisi City Court.
17. Mindadze Giorgi - Article 353¹.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 5 years - Tbilisi City Court.
18. Jikia Saba - Article 353¹.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 4 years and 6 months - Tbilisi City Court.

19. Kvaratskhelia Anzori - Article 353¹.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 4 years and 6 months - Tbilisi Court of Appeal.
20. Jorbenadze Mamuka - Article 126.1¹.b. and c. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Fine in the amount of 20 000 GEL. Taking into account the length of his detention, the sentence was reduced to 2000 GEL - Batumi City Court.
21. Mikeladze Gurami - Article 126.1¹.b. and c. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Fine in the amount of 17 000 GEL. Taking into account the length of his detention, the sentence was reduced to 2000 GEL - Batumi City Court.
22. Gvianidze Daviti - Article 126.1¹.b. and c. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Fine in the amount of 17 000 GEL. Taking into account the length of his detention, the sentence was reduced to 2000 GEL - Batumi City Court.
23. Davitadze Giorgi - Article 126.1¹.b. and c. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Fine in the amount of 17 000 GEL. Taking into account the length of his detention, the sentence was reduced to 2000 GEL - Batumi City Court.
24. Kakabadze Anri - Article 126.1¹.b. and c. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 9 months (He was released after serving the sentence) - Batumi City Court.
25. Amaghlobeli Mzia – Article 353¹. of the Criminal Code of Georgia. - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 353.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced her imprisonment for a term of 2 years of under Article 353. This was not changed by a court of appeals - Kutaisi Court of Appeals.
26. Akhobadze Giorgi - Article 260.6.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – The judgement of acquittal - Tbilisi City Court.
27. Lomidze Daviti - Article 353¹.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 4 years and 6 months - Tbilisi City Court.
28. Zasokhashvili Temuri - Article 353¹.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 4 years and 6 months - Tbilisi City Court.
29. Gigauri Anatoli - Article 353¹.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 353.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years of under Article 353. This was not changed by a court of appeals - Tbilisi Court of Appeals.
30. Abramovi Tevdore - Article 260.6.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – The judgement of acquittal - Tbilisi City Court.
31. Khomeriki Daviti - Article 18-229.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 4 years and 6 months - Tbilisi City Court.
32. Museliantsi Archili - Article 187.2.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 4 years - Tbilisi City Court.
33. Chechin Anton - Article 260.6.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 8 years and 6 months - Tbilisi City Court.
34. Javakhishvili Nikolozi - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years. - Tbilisi City Court.
35. Goshadze Tornike - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years. - Tbilisi City Court.
36. Miminoshvili Irakli - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years. - Tbilisi City Court.
37. Tsetskhladze Zviadi - Article 225.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years and 6 months. - Tbilisi City Court.
38. Kasradze Vepkhia - Article 225.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years and 6 months. - Tbilisi City Court.

39. Kadzeshvili Vasili - Article 225.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years and 6 months. - Tbilisi City Court.
40. Gorgadze Giorgi - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years. - Tbilisi City Court.
41. Aliev Insaf - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years. - Tbilisi City Court.
42. Skhvitaridze Saba - Article 353¹.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia was requalified by the prosecution to Article 120.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 2 years - Tbilisi City Court.
43. Chichinadze Andro - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years. - Tbilisi City Court.
44. Tskhadadze Onise - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years. - Tbilisi City Court.
45. Mirtskhulava Gurami - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years. - Tbilisi City Court.
46. Archaia Jano - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years. - Tbilisi City Court.
47. Jabua Luka - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years. - Tbilisi City Court.
48. Sivakov Ruslan - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years. - Tbilisi City Court.
49. Kiknadze Revazi - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years. - Tbilisi City Court.
50. Terishvili Giorgi - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance changed Terishvili's qualification and sentenced him to 2 years of imprisonment under Article 226 of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Tbilisi City Court.
51. Tetrashvili Valeri - Article 225.2 of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance changed Tetrashvili's qualification and sentenced him to 2 years of imprisonment under Article 226 of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Tbilisi City Court.
52. Kukharchuk Sergei - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years. - Tbilisi City Court.
53. Kerashvili Irakli - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years. - Tbilisi City Court.
54. Katsia Nikoloz - Article 260.6.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – The judgement of acquittal - Tbilisi City Court.
55. Zinovkina Anastasia - Article 260.6.a. and b. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 8 years and 6 months - Tbilisi City Court.
56. Gribuli Artem - Article 260.6.a. and b. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 8 years and 6 months - Tbilisi City Court.

57. Ratiani Zviadi - Article 353¹.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia. - The court of first instance has changed the qualification of the case and under Article 353.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia, sentenced him imprisonment for a term of 2 years of under Article 353.
58. Elisashvili Alexander - Article 156.2.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – The detention was replaced with bail in the amount of 4,000 GEL - Tbilisi City Court.
59. Tsignadze Irakli - Article 19-222.2.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 5,000 GEL with the provision of detention (He was released from detention after payment) - Tbilisi City Court.
60. Ugulava Giorgi Article 19-222.2.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 5,000 GEL with the provision of detention (He was released from detention after payment) - Tbilisi City Court.
61. Bidzinashvili Dimitri - Article 19-222.2.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 5,000 GEL with the provision of detention (He was released from detention after payment) - Tbilisi City Court.
62. Tabatadze Irakli - Article 19-222.2.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 5,000 GEL with the provision of detention (He was released from detention after payment) - Tbilisi City Court.
63. Kutubidze Nikolozi - Article 19-222.2.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 3500 GEL with the provision of detention (He was released from detention after payment) - Tbilisi City Court.
64. Eliava Vasili - Article 19-222.2.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 3500 GEL with the provision of detention (He was released from detention after payment) - Tbilisi City Court.
65. Kumsiashvili Nikolozi - Article 19-222.2.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 4,000 GEL with the provision of detention (He was released from detention after payment) - Tbilisi City Court.
66. Gogoladze Aleksandre - Article 19-222.2.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 5,000 GEL with the provision of detention (He was released from detention after payment) - Tbilisi City Court.
67. Datashvili Nino - Article 353³. 3. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Based on the prosecuton's motion, the detention was replaced with a bail in the amount of 5,000 GEL - Tbilisi City Court.
68. Toshkhua Tornike - Article 126.1¹.b. of the Criminal Code of Georgia -Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
69. Shervashidze Mindia - Article 126.1¹.b. of the Criminal Code of Georgia -Detention - Tbilisi City Court.

II. Some of the accused persons in connection with the events of 4 October:

70. Beridze Lasha - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
71. Zhgenti Daviti - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
72. Gogoladze Aleksandre - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
73. Rurua Giorgi - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
74. Mzhavanadze Kakhaberi - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
75. Mchedlishvili Tornike - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
76. Naveriani Abo - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
77. Shashiashvili Eva - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
78. Sturua Daviti - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
79. Pitskhelauri Vakhtangi - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
80. Machavariani Beka - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
81. Mikeladze Manuchari - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
82. Khabeishvili Aleksandre - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.

83. Megrelishvili Sergo - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
84. Kordzaia Saba - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
85. Katashvili Gocha - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
86. Sander Nana – Articles 225.1.; 317. of the Criminal Code of Georgia- Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
87. Abalava Sulkhani - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2.of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
88. Kelekhsashvili Beka – Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2.of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
89. Kirvalidze Giorgi - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2 of the Criminal Code of Georgia. - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
90. Gvelesiani Vladimiri- Articles 19-222.2.a. of the Criminal Code of Georgia; 225.2. - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
91. Eptashvili Koba - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
92. Labuchidze Mamuka - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
93. Gventsadze Nika - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2 of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
94. Kokaia Konstantine - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
95. Chavchanidze Zurabi - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
96. Kardava Gurieli - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
97. Kupreishvili Genadi - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
98. Chilachava Aleksandre - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
99. Jikia Levani - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
100. Tughushi Sulkhani - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
101. Ivanidze Lasha - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
102. Chakhunashvili Giorgi - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 20,000 GEL with the provision of detention (He was released from detention after payment) - Tbilisi City Court.
103. Muladze Giorgi - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
104. Chkhvirkia Irakli - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
105. Dolishvili Amirani - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
106. Korkia Giorgi - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
107. Albutashvili Zakro - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
108. Mamuladze Ramazi - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
109. Gogokhia Khvicha - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
110. Surmanidze Avtandili - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
111. Darakhvelidze Ia - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 10,000 GEL with the provision of detention (She released from detention after payment) - Tbilisi City Court.
112. Uper Anton - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – Detention (in absentia) - Tbilisi City Court.
113. Vardanidze Anton - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention (in absentia) - Tbilisi City Court.
114. Mekantsishvili Mariami - Article 226. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 10,000 GEL with the provision of detention (She was released from detention after payment) - Tbilisi City Court.
115. Lomidze Iuri - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
116. Giunashvili Daviti- Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – Detention - Tbilisi City Court.

117. Talakhadze Giorgi - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – Detention - Tbilisi City Court
118. Kurtsikidze Temuri – Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
119. Makharadze Simon - Article 225.2 of the Criminal Code - Imprisonment - Tbilisi City Court.
120. Kvachantiradze Kakhaberi - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
121. Toloraia Gia - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
122. Toloraia Mikheili - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
123. Zhvania Guri - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
124. Topchishvili Avtandili - Article 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
125. Ghurtskaia Daviti - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
126. Kelikhashvili Genadi - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
127. Jorbenadze Ramazi - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
128. Tirkia Jandri - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
129. Shaishmelashvili Irakli - Article 317. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – Detention (in absentia) - Tbilisi City Court.
130. Kirtava Tamari - Article 154.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 3000 GEL - Tbilisi City Court.
131. Dushenko Giorgi - Article 154.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 3000 GEL - Tbilisi City Court.
132. Otinashvili Mariami - Article 154.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 3000 GEL - Tbilisi City Court.
133. Papunashvili/Gabelia Inga - Article 154.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 3000 GEL - Tbilisi City Court.
134. Gabelia Vakhtangi - Article 154.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 3000 GEL - Tbilisi City Court.
135. Tsnobiladze Aleksandre - Article 154.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 3000 GEL - Tbilisi City Court.
136. Tsulaia Irakli - Article 154.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 5000 GEL - Tbilisi City Court.

III. Other Ongoing Cases:

137. Diasamidze Irma (Megi) - Article 187.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 2000 GEL with the provision of detention (She was released from detention after payment) - Tbilisi City Court.
138. Khasaia Gela - Article 118.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
139. Kerdikoshvili Vasili - Article 118.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention- Tbilisi City Court.
140. Lortkipanidze Tamari – Articles 126.1.; 353¹.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention- Tbilisi City Court.
141. Menteshashvili Zurabi - Article 347. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention- Tbilisi City Court.
142. Bachiashvili Giorgi - 1) Articles 182.3.b.; 194.3. of the Criminal Code of Georgia; - Imprisonment for a term of 11 years - Tbilisi Court of Appeals; 2) Article 344.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 4 years and 6 months - Tbilisi City Court; 3) Article 220¹.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - ongoing - Tbilisi City Court.
143. Karumidze Shota - Article 25 - 344.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 4 years and 6 months - Tbilisi City Court.
144. Chikvaidze Giorgi - Articles 182.2.a. and d.; 182.3.b. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 9 years - Tbilisi City Court.
145. Papiashvili Irakli - Articles 182.2.a. and d.; 182.3.b. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 8 years - Tbilisi City Court.

IV. Charged/Convicted Politicians:

i. Cases Related to the Parliamentary Temporary Investigative Commission / the so-called “Sabotage” Cases:

146. Gvaramia Nika - 1) Article 349. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 8 months, prohibition from holding a position in the public service for a term of 2 years - Tbilisi City Court. 2) Article 318.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - ongoing - Tbilisi City Court.
147. Vashadze Giorgi - 1) Article 349. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 7 months, prohibition from holding a position in the public service for a term of 2 years - Tbilisi City Court. 2) Articles 318.1.; 319. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Ongoing - Tbilisi City Court.
148. Targamadze Givi - 1) Article 349. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 7 months, prohibition from holding a position in the public service for a term of 2 years - Tbilisi City Court.
149. Melia Nikanori - 1) Article 349. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - imprisonment for a term of 8 months, prohibition from holding a position in the civil service for a term of 2 years, fine in the amount of 25 000 GEL for a previous unenforceable judgement. - Tbilisi City Court. 2) Article 318.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Ongoing - Tbilisi City Court.
150. Okruashvili Irakli - 1) Article 349. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - imprisonment for a term of 8 months, prohibition from holding a position in the public service for a term of 2 years - Tbilisi City Court.
151. Saakashvili Mikheil - Article 317. of the Criminal Code of Georgia (He is sentenced to imprisonment on other criminal cases) - Tbilisi City Court.
152. Khazaradze Mamuka - 1) Article 349. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 8 months, prohibition from holding public office for a term of 2 years (He was pardoned by Mikheil Kavelashvili) - Tbilisi City Court. 2) Article 318.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 1 000 000 GEL - Tbilisi City Court.
153. Khoshtaria Elene - 1) Article 187.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 5000 GEL with the provision of detention (In custody due to failure to pay the bail) - Tbilisi City Court. 2) Articles 318.1; 319; 321¹ .1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Tbilisi City Court.
154. Japaridze Badri - 1) Article 349. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 8 months, prohibition from holding public office for a term of 2 years (He was pardoned by Mikheil Kavelashvili) - Tbilisi City Court. 2) Article 318.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 1 000 000 GEL - Tbilisi City Court.
155. Japaridze Zurabi (Girchi) – 1) Article 349. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Imprisonment for a term of 7 months, prohibition from holding a position in the public service for a term of 2 years - Tbilisi City Court. 2) Articles 318.1.; 319 of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Tbilisi City Court.

ii. Politicians Charged in Relation to the 4 October Events:

156. Burchuladze Paata - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.1.; 317 of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention- Tbilisi City Court.
157. Zodelava Murtazi - 1) Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.1.; 317. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – Detention - Tbilisi City Court. 2) Article 364.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - bail in the amount of 25 000 GEL with provision of detention - Tbilisi City Court.
158. Manjgaladze Paata - Article 225.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia – Detention - Tbilisi City Court.
159. Nadiradze Irakli - Articles 19-222.2.a.; 225.1.; 317. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention- Tbilisi City Court.
160. Khabeishvili Levani – Articles 339.2.; 317. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention- Tbilisi City Court.

iii. Other Cases of Politicians:

161. Gakharia Giorgi - Articles 25-117.3.m.; 333.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia- Detention (in absentia) - Tbilisi City Court.

(This chapter refers to N. 58 (Elisashvili Aleksandre) and N. 60 (Ugulava Giorgi) presented in the list. In addition, A. Elisashvili was charged under Article 19-323(1) of the Criminal Code of Georgia in connection with the act he allegedly committed on 29 November 2025. He is currently in custody.)¹

iv. Several Former Senior Officials of the Georgian Dream who have been Charged:

162. Burchuladze Juansheri - Articles 194.3.c; 332.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention- Tbilisi City Court.

163. Gabunia Koba - Article 332.2. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.

164. Tabidze Daviti - 332.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 300 000 GEL with the provision of detention - Tbilisi City Court.

165. Gharibashvili Irakli - Article 194.3.c. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Bail in the amount of 1 000 000 GEL, prohibition to leave the country - Tbilisi City Court.

166. Khaindrava Giorgi - 182.2.a. and d.; 182.3.b. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention - Tbilisi City Court.

167. Khundadze Vladimiri - 332.1. of the Criminal Code of Georgia - Detention (in absentia) - Tbilisi City Court.

¹ Statement of the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia, 30.11.2025, <https://pog.gov.ge/news/prokuraturam-tbilisis-saqalaqo-sasamartloshi-teroris-tuli-aqtis-chadenis-mtsdelobis-faqtze-aleqsandre-elisashvils-braldeba-tsarudgina-5262> [09.12.2025].